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A SOCIO-PRAGMATIC COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OSTENSIBLE INVITATIONS IN ENGLISH AND FARSI

by
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TO MY PARENTS

FOR

THEIR LOVE AND SUPPORT

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ABSTRACT

Of late, linguistics has been trying to come up with a universal theory of language. Linguists, sociolinguists, and psycholinguists have focused on the different aspects of language. The sum of all their efforts has, no doubt, contributed to the developing field of Universal Grammar. However, the field calls for a good number of other research projects in the different languages of the world.

As such, the present study was carried out with the aim of examining Farsi ostensible invitations in terms of the universals of pragmatics. To this end, 45 field workers observed and reported 566 ostensible and 607 genuine invitations. 34 undergraduates were interviewed and afforded 68 ostensible and 68 genuine invitations. And, 41 pairs of friends were interviewed and afforded 41 ostensible invitations. The data were then put to statistical tests: the comparison of ratios was carried out for the purposes of comparing the ratios of the two types of invitations (for any probable difference) in terms of the seven features that control their use in the English language; the chi-square test was also carried out to determine whether the type of invitation was dependent on such variables as the sex, age, and social class of the inviters or not.

The results of the data analysis revealed that Farsi ostensible invitations go by the universal norms that influence language use. It was also concluded that the type of invitation was dependent on the variables mentioned above.

CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

1.0. Preliminaries

Language is a means of communication. People use language to accomplish such functions as ordering, promising, arguing, and so on. However, any communicative function needs to be carried out within a context, which may either be interpersonal or social. In the process of communication the speakers of a language are expected to be in possession of two sets of capabilities: They should have knowledge of the forms of language they use. Moreover, they must know how to use this knowledge in negotiating meaning. In order to clarify meaning, the speakers and hearers or writers and readers should be able to interact.

The term context has two aspects: social and interpersonal. Social context is important in studies that focus on sociolinguistic aspects of language. Interpersonal context, however, should be studied, according to Levinson (1983), in such sub-disciplines as pragmatics, conversation(al) analysis, and discourse analysis. In the present study interpersonal context plays a critical role.

Needless to say, the definition of the term pragmatics serves as a good point of departure. According to Levinson (1983: 24), Pragmatics refers to “the study of the ability of language users to pair sentences with the contexts in which they would be appropriate.” Pragmatics covers a number of topics including the “speech-act theory” or the study of how we do things with sentences. The speech act theory concerns itself with the functions of language. It is usually argued that communication is capable of being dismantled into a series of speech acts or communicative acts. These acts are used in a systematic way to accomplish certain purposes.

The notion of the speech act theory has motivated a good number of researchers to

fathom the depths of the relationships between form and meaning. A number of research projects have focused on the study of conversations. The most outstanding approaches to the study of conversations include conversation(al) analysis and discourse analysis. The former refers to the analysis of natural conversation. It aims at discovering the linguistic features of conversation. It also determines how conversation is used in every-day life. The latter, however, refers to the study of how sentences combine (in spoken/written language) to form such larger meaningful units as paragraphs, paratones, conversations, interviews, etc.

Conversation is assumed to be under the control of a set of maxims and principles. It usually proceeds according to interlocutors' appreciation of these maxims as they appear in the utterances of others. These maxims are usually attended to. However, there are cases in which these maxims are violated for one reason or another. According to Leech (1983:149), conversational principles include first-order principles (including cooperative principle, politeness principle, interest principle, and pollyanna principle), and higher-order principles (including irony and banter). The cooperative principle draws on four maxims: quality, quantity, relation, and manner. The politeness principle, however, includes seven maxims: tact, generosity, approbation, modesty, agreement, phatic, and sympathy.

Grice (1967) was the first person to propose the concept of cooperative principle. According to this principle, language is interpreted on the assumption that its sender is cooperating with the receiver in an attempt to exchange meaning by observing (or violating) a number of maxims. As mentioned in the above paragraph, the cooperative principle has four maxims (see Leech, 1983:149). It is usually assumed that the receiver is capable of comprehending the pragmatic meaning of an utterance (the meaning which the words take on in a particular context, and between particular interlocutors) on the bases of these maxims and the general knowledge of the world or schemata. These also help the receiver to discern what the sender intends to do with his or her words.

The speakers of a language often violate these conversational maxims for one purpose

or another. Listeners usually assume, upon noticing such violations, that the speakers make these violations for a good reason. In plain terms, the speaker intends the hearer to notice instances of these violations or faults and draw conclusions. These conclusions have been referred to as “conversational implicatures” by Grice (1975).

The politeness principle is also composed of a number of maxims. Listeners usually assume that these maxims are being followed in the utterances of others. The term politeness means putting things in such a way as to consider the feelings of the hearer. Politeness can be manifested both verbally (in speech) and non-verbally (in action). As Argule and Dean put it (cited by Leech, 1983:12), politeness is often a function of “dynamic and standing features of communication.” Standing features tend to remain constant over a long period of time (for instance, the social distance between participants). Dynamic features, however, undergo continuous change and modification during discourse (for instance, the kind of illocutionary demand). These to feature categories interact to gear the degree of politeness to the situation in an appropriate way. The first and most important function of politeness is to make sure that our interlocutors are being cooperative. In other words, politeness has a regulative social function.

Brown and Levinson (1987) are famous for their work on politeness which is usually viewed as a powerful constraint on linguistic expression. According to Brown and Levinson (1987), there is an “economy” of politeness in which there exists a finite quantity of the principle medium of linguistic exchange referred to as “face.” They (P.61) argue that the notion of face is derived from what Goffman proposed in 1967. Face is something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced.

There are three important factors that determine the distribution of face among interlocutors: (1) solidarity i.e. the horizontal social distance between participants (D), (2) power relation i.e. the vertical social distance (P), and (3) the weightiness of the imposition negotiated by interlocutors (R).

Social distance is a “symmetric dimension of similarity/difference ... based on an

assessment of the frequency of interaction and the kinds of materials or non-material goods (including face) exchanged between S(peaker) and H(earer)" (Brown and Levinson, 1987:76). Power, however, is an "asymmetric social dimension of relative power" which involves the degree to which "H can impose his own plans and his own self-evaluation (face) at the expense of S's plans and self-evaluation" or vice versa (P. 76). The third factor (i.e. the weightiness of imposition) involves the degree to which impositions are considered to interfere with an agent's want of "self-determination or of approval" (P.77). Impositions are ranked on the basis of the "expenditure of services (including provision of time) and of goods" (non-material goods like information, expression of regard and other payments included) (P.77). Brown and Levinson contend that any speech act has the potential of threatening either the face of the speaker or that of the hearer. They believe that conversation is much more concerned with observing politeness expectations designed to ensure the "redress of face than with the exchange of information." They have proposed a direct relationship between social distance and politeness in such a way as to indicate that an increase in social distance will bring about an increase in the degree of politeness and vice versa.

The notion of politeness finds meaning when it is studied in the context of face-threatening acts (or FTA's) which include positive and negative ones. In other words, some FTA's threaten negative face and some others threaten positive face. The former includes directives such as commands, requests, advice, invitations, etc. The latter, on the other hand, includes criticisms, insults, disagreements, and corrections.

A definition of the term "face" seems to be necessary here. According to Brown and Levinson (1), two aspects of people's feelings are involved in face. The first is the desire of the individual not to be imposed on -- which they called negative face. The second (i.e. the so-called positive face) is the desire of the individual to be liked or approved of. According to Wolfson (1989: 67):

> In deciding how much to take another person's feelings into account, we have three factors to consider. First, people are usually more polite

> to others when they are of higher status or perceived of as being powerful; second, people are generally more polite to others who are socially distant; and third, we are usually more polite in relation to the gravity of the threat we are about to make to others' face.

Politeness is then the manifestation, through speech, of respect for another individual's face. An example of positive politeness is our positive evaluation of our interlocutor's accomplishments, appearence, etc. Positive politeness also includes hints and signals that show the listener he or she is considered a friend and member of the speaker's "in-group." This may be accomplished through such strategies as giving gifts, showing interest in the other, extending invitations towards the other, etc. Negative politeness, however, involves a show of deference. The speaker, through negative politeness, usually tries to show the listener that he does not wish to disturb or to interfere with the other's freedom. Apologies, indirect requests, and other forms of remedial work usually appear in this category.

The term "invitation" finds occasion in the contexts of "politeness" and "face." It is, therefore, necessary to define the term here.

> According to popular wisdom, social commitments are normally arrived at through unambiguous invitations. Our operational definition of such a speech act is that it contains reference to time and/or mention of place or activity, and most important, a request for response. A simple example would be the following:
>
> | | | |
> |---|---|---|
> | Do you want | to have lunch | tomorrow? |
> | (request for response) | (activity) | (time) |
>
> (Wolfson, 1989:119)

Invitations are usually viewed as arrangements for a social commitment. There are, however, a number of cases in which an invitation is extended but is not necessarily followed by the conclusion of the arrangement under discussion. In other words, one can never be sure whether such invitations were ever intended to be completed. However, the utterance (i.e. the commitment) itself embraces a number of features that make it recognizable to the interlocutors that the invitation is not a real one. These

features include: (1) time is always left indefinite; (2) a response is not required (i.e. there is no yes/no question); and (3) a modal auxiliary such as “must” or “should” is almost always used.

Along the same lines, Clark and Isaacs (1990) carried out a research project on ostensible invitations. According to them, people sometimes extend invitations they do not intend to be taken seriously. They argued that the aim of such exchanges is not to establish invitations but to accomplish some other, unstated purpose. They have pointed out that ostensible invitations seem patently designed as face-saving devices.

According to Clark and Isaacs (1990), ostensible invitations possess five defining properties: (1) pretense (i.e. the inviter pretends to make a sincere invitation), (2) mutual recognition (i.e. the interactants mutually recognize the inviter’s pretense), (3) collusion (i.e. the invitee responds appropriately to the inviter’s pretense), (4) ambivalence (i.e. when asked “Do you really mean it?” the inviter cannot sincerely answer either “yes” or “no.”), and (5) off-record purpose (i.e. the inviter’s main purpose is tacit).

The scholars also listed seven defining features for ostensible invitations. These features clearly manifest the strategies employed by the inviters to signal to the invitees that the invitation is an ostensible one. According to Clark and Isaacs, whenever the inviter (A) *ostensibly* invites the invitee (B) to event (E), the inviter may do one or more of the following:

1. A makes B’s presence at E implausible;
2. A extends invitations only after they have been solicited;
3. A doesn’t motivate invitation beyond social courtesy;
4. A is vague about arrangements for event E;
5. A doesn’t persist or insist on the invitation;
6. A hedges the invitation; And
7. A delivers the invitation with inappropriate cues.

The present study concerns itself with a descriptive survey of ostensible invitations in Farsi. It will then try to establish a cross-linguistic analysis of ostensible invitations in English and Farsi.

1.1. Purpose of the Study

This study has a two-fold goal. On the one hand, it seeks to determine whether the defining properties of ostensible invitations mentioned in the previous section (i.e. pretense, ambivalence, collusion, mutual recognition, and off-record purpose) hold true for ostensible invitations in Farsi. On the other hand, it compares Farsi ostensible invitations to English ones in terms of the seven features listed in the previous section.

The following are among the issues this study aims at exploring:

a) Whether Farsi native speakers extend invitations for purposes of politeness ;
b) Whether Farsi ostensible invitations observe all of the defining properties of English ostensible invitations; and
c) Whether Farsi inviters take advantage of the same strategies in their extending ostensible invitations as their English counterparts do.

Needless to say, any description of speech acts should take into account the relationships which exist between the act and the context in which the act is used. In exactly the same way, a description of ostensible invitations should evaluate the use of such exchanges in context. This study aims to do so. To this end, the following checklist will be of great help:

A. What is the inviter's social role (in situation and in relation to the invitee's)?
    1. Male or female?
    2. Age: young, adult, old?
    3. Economical, social, and educational status?
    4. Feeling of solidarity with the invitee?

B. What is the conversational situation?
    1. The length of the acquaintance of the interlocutors?
    2. The number of the participants in the discourse?
    3. The type of the discourse?
        a. Social small talk?
        b. Information sharing?

C. What is the inviter's psychological context?

1. The inviter's confidence in what he is saying?
2. The impression the inviter wants to make?
3. The assumptions the inviter has about the invitee, himself/herself, and of conversation?

This study will endeavor to clarify the relationships that may exist between ostensible invitations and the above checklist.

1.2. Significance of the Study

The significance of this study can be discussed from two major perspectives: (1) on the one hand, it results in further explication of the linguistic theory in general and the pragmatic theory in particular; (2) on the other hand, it can serve a good number of applied purposes.

Modern linguistics has always been trying to establish a general, exhaustive, comprehensive, and unified theory of (the nature of) language. In this respect, a great deal of research projects have been carried out to explore the nature of this phenomenon. Some of these studies have scanned the linguistic aspects of language. Yet, others have delved into the relationship between language and society. The present study tries to shed light on the interaction of form and pragmatics.

This study will also contribute to different domains of applied linguistics. Aspects of language use in general, and sociopragmatic aspects of language in specific, could be and should be employed in language teaching programs. Widdowson (1979:90) argues that language teaching should "effect the transfer from grammatical competence, a knowledge of sentences, to what has been called communicative competence, a knowledge of how sentences are used in the performance of communicative acts of different kinds." He also believes that grammatical competence will remain in a perpetual state of potentiality unless it is realized in communication. In other words, there are rules of use without which the rules of grammar would be useless. Widdowson

also believes that theoretical studies of discourse might indicate the nature of the rules of use and provide some clues to as to “how we might approach teaching them” (1979: 90). It is, therefore, the responsibility of ESL and EFL teachers to endeavor to make their students aware of and sensitive to the sociolinguistic variables that play an important role in different kinds of situational frames. These will serve as useful strategies for communication which will enable the learner to communicate his thoughts in actual contexts long after he has left the language classroom.

Having mastered the specific function of a given utterance, a translator will find it exceptionally easy to find the most appropriate equivalents in the target language. A knowledge of contrastive invitation formulas will help translators, especially those involved in the translation of texts with heavy cultural and social orientations. Film dubbers will also benefit from studies of this kind.

Furthermore, because many research projects have focused on the written aspects of language, it is vital to carry out research with the aim of explicating the nature of spoken language. Studies of this kind will undoubtedly enable us to find out the different forms and functions of spoken language. The present study has been carried out with the aim of examining the different functions ostensible invitations seek to satisfy.

1.3. Scope of the Study

The review of the literature shows that a large variety of social parameters and linguistic variables have been investigated by sociolinguists. In fact, there are a number of issues that have slipped the attention of sociolinguists and other scholars in the field. However, because a good number of social factors such as culture, ethnicity, and generation are not easy to process, researchers usually keep aloof from them. In other words, most researchers entertain themselves with the study of easy-to-handle factors and variables. For the same reason, the present study has limited its scope to such parameters as sex, age, and economical status which are readily manageable and lend

themselves to quantitative analyses.

This study will also endeavor to contribute to the notion of language universals through the examination of Farsi ostensible invitations in terms of the defining properties and features of ostensible invitations proposed by Clark and Isaacs (1990). To this end, exactly the same methods of data analysis and interpretation will be employed in the analysis, quantification, and interpretation of the corpus.

1.4. Outline of the Study

In addition to the CHAPTER ONE, *Introduction*, this thesis is composed of four other chapters.

CHAPTER TWO, *Review of the Related Literature*:

(1) elaborates on the significance of context and tries to illustrate the relationship between form, meaning, and function of an utterance;

(2) provides a definition of pragmatics, traces the historical origin of the different usages the term pragmatics has been put to, and outlines the scope of pragmatics;

(3) reviews the notion of the speech act theory, and enumerates the flaws and shortcomings involved with this theory;

(4) delineates the different approaches to the study of conversation;

(5) provides a periphery of such conversational principles as cooperative and politeness principles;

(6) reviews, in a detailed manner, the studies, both theoretical and empirical, that have been carried out on invitations in general and ostensible invitations in particular; and

(7) explains ostensible invitations in English.

CHAPTER THREE, *Methodology*, does the following respectively:

(1) defines the key terms and concepts used through out the study for purposes of clarifying the study;

(2) introduces the subjects of the study;

(3) describes the materials used in the study and justifies the selection of the corpus for the study;

(4) outlines the characteristics of the data and explains the framework for the study; and

(5) elaborates on the procedures used to the analysis of the data.

CHAPTER FOUR, *Data Analysis*:

(1) uses necessary tables to present the results and findings of the data analysis; and

(2) interprets the table(s) for purposes of making the study understandable.

CHAPTER FIVE, *Conclusion and Pedagogical Implications*:

(1) provides a summary of the chapters;

(2) discusses the conclusions of the study;

(3) discusses the pedagogical implications of the study; and

(4) provides some suggestions for further research.

CHAPTER TWO
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE

2.0. Introduction

In order to broaden our understanding of communication in different social contexts, we must study sociolinguistic phenomena. Even though sociolinguistics has taken its roots in sociology, they are distinct in terms of the objectives they pursue. The former concentrates on society for purposes of understanding the features of language use in social contexts. The latter, however, focuses on language for understanding the society and its structure (Giglioli, 1972). Sociolinguistics began to flourish from the early sixties. Its origins, however, can be traced back to a long time ago. A review of the history of the field manifests the theoretical development it has undergone in progression towards its contemporary state. In fact, the progression has been from a context-free view of language towards the treatment of language in its social context. This change of view is the result of different theories proposed of language and its nature. One has to review the theories and philosophies on which the study of language has rested during its evolution to understand the tenets of sociolinguistics and to get an idea of how it has been developed. This chapter, therefore, aims at the following: (1) elaborating on the relationship between form, meaning, and function of an utterance, (2) explaining the significance of context in the course of communication, (3) discussing the notion of pragmatics, as well as its scope, (4) discussing the notion of the speech act theory and stating the flaws of this theory, (5) making some remarks on the various approaches to the study of conversation, (6) discussing the two most important conversational principles (i.e. the cooperative and the politeness principles), and (7) reviewing the studies on invitations in general and ostensible invitations in particular.

2.1. Structuralism

The changes that have occurred in linguistic theory have resulted in the emergence of

sociolinguistics. From among the early approaches to the study of language, the most systematic and elaborated one is the so-called structuralism. It developed out of Saussure's (1916) concept of *"langue"* as the subject matter of linguistics. He divided language into "langue" and *"parole."* According to Saussure, *la langue* is localized in the "limited segment of the speaking circuit where an auditory image (s) becomes associated with a concept (c)." La langue is the "social side of language, outside the individual who can never create or modify it by himself; it exists only by virtue of a sort of contract signed by the members of a community" (Kristeva, 1989: 9). In other words, la langue exists perfectly only within a collectivity. *La parole* (i.e. speech) is always "individual, and the individual is always its matter" (Kristeva, 1989: 9). Speech is, according to Saussure's definition, an individual, willful, and intelligent act. It is composed of (1) the combination by which the speaker uses la langue's code; and (2) the psychophysical mechanism that allows him to externalize these combinations.

With such a view of language, structuralism considered it necessary to bother with the study of actual speech in social interactions. On the basis of the linguistic intuitions of a few informants, structuralist found it fruitful to analyze the homogeneous, abstract, and invariant rules of language. In structuralism, the aim of linguistics is the elaboration of context-free grammatical rules that account for that part of linguistic behavior which is uniform and homogeneous. Structuralists, therefore, viewed language variation as some unimportant deviations from the norm.

2.2. Generativism

Chomsky introduced his concept of linguistic competence as a major development in formal linguistics. In his notion of linguistic competence, Chomsky introduced Saussure's notion of langue with greater emphasis on the homogeneity of language knowledge. For him, linguistics is the study of a homogeneous speech community where everyone speaks alike. According to Chomsky, the data of linguistics are not the utterances of the individual. They are rather the individual's intuitions about language.

Formal linguistics, therefore, is not concerned with social patterns in language use. It

excludes the study of speech and social behavior (Fishman, 1971). On the basis of formal linguistics, therefore, one would conclude that a person endowed with mere linguistic competence would only know the grammatical rules of his language. He would not know when to speak, which sociolinguistic options to select, and on what occasion.

Chomsky and Halle (1968), and Bach and Harm (1968) have tried to prepare a description of language system. They have focused on the formalization of universal grammatical rules in their description of competence. Having no relevance to the explanation of the social basis of verbal behavior, this formalization uses categorical rules as a describing tool. These rules are quite abstract, invariant, and independent of social influences. They do not heed such things as class, status, and other stratifications. They do not respond to stylistic shift either. According to Wardhaugh (1986), they are not subject to variation. The mere use of categorical rules for linguistic description implies formal linguists' lack of concern with social aspects of language.

2.3. Transition from Structuralism to Contextualism

The advent of Chomsky's TGG in the middle fifties and its emphasis on the independence and isolation of language from social effects resulted in the evolution of an opposition group. This group was composed of anthropological linguists and sociolinguists who maintained that the context of language, the ethnography of communication, and the description of language function must be incorporated in the grammar of language. Chomsky's notion of language uniformity and his idealized, context-free treatment of grammar came under heavy attack (Ghosh, 1972).

Some anthropologists were exclusively concerned with the structural analysis of grammar in different cultures. With this viewpoint, they recognized the problems of formal linguistics stated above, and directed their efforts away from its direction. These scholars never considered language in isolation from social life. They, however, insisted on the interdependence of language and cultural and social structures. This, in turn, led linguists to recognize the use of multiple linguistic codes within the same community.

In this way, the notion of linguistic homogeneity was challenged.

The influence of anthropologists stimulated formal grammarians to begin to free themselves from their previous misconception about language. They began to recognize the importance of language variation, change, planning, etc. in relation to social factors. Firth (1957), for instance, shifted towards the incorporation of social factors into grammar. He considered it doubtful whether there is any meaning in language apart from its context. He introduced the notion of *contextuality* to language analysis (my italics). This, in turn, influenced the British school of structuralism to consider social context of linguistic forms. Along the same lines, Prague linguists shifted toward the adoption, according to Dittmar (1976), of a similar stance in the investigation of language.

2.4. The Birth of Sociolinguistics

Sociolinguistic theory is the offspring of the process of transition from the so-called structuralism to contextualism. In contrast to linguistic theory, sociolinguistic theory emphasizes the appropriateness of verbal message in context. Gumperz and Hymes (1972) argue that this theory posits beyond the grammar a level of rule-governed verbal behavior that relates linguistic and social constraints. Doughty, et al. (1972), however, assume a more radical view in this regard. They argue that the constraints upon what we say and the way in which we say it are of a social origin. They even go on to admit that "speakers do not have a direct acquaintance with language any more than they do with society. What they actually experience is the linguistic manifestation of relationships" (Doughty, et al., 1972: 83).

The interest in sociolinguistics or the so-called social aspects of language stimulated the linguists to go beyond the mere structural analysis of grammatical systems. They, as a result, concentrated on the language use by human groups, social strata, geographical regions, etc. They began to entertain themselves with the socially-patterned variation in linguistic behavior and the identification of those factors that affect and predict such variations. Sociolinguists turned out to be considerate of variable rules for the

description of those linguistic forms that were socially loaded. This caused linguists to question the validity of Chomsky's linguistic competence and any other descriptive method that ruled out any concern for variation and diversity in language. The flaws of the notion of linguistic competence paved the way for the birth of the more comprehensive notion of communicative competence.

2.5. Communicative Competence

Hymes (1974) introduced the concept of communicative competence. He argued that communication is not governed by fixed linguistic rules. It is, however, a two-step process in which the speaker first evaluates the social context of the speech and then select among the communicative options available for encoding his intent. In other words, linguistic competence is not the only element responsible for communication. Rather, an interaction is perceivable between linguistic knowledge and society.

Communicative competence postulates linguistic diversity or a repertoire of linguistic codes for the same concept. On the basis of the situation, the competent speaker can choose an appropriate code. In doing so, the speaker uses the so-called knowledge of the components of speech (i.e. SPEAKING). According to Hymes, any speech situation possesses eight defining features: (1) S refers to the setting (i.e. the time, place, physical circumstances, and psychological setting or scene); (2) P refers to participants (i.e. speaker, addressor, hearer, and addressee); (3) E refers to the ends (i.e. purpose, outcomes, and goals); (4) A refers to act sequences (i.e. message content and message form); (5) K refers to keys (i.e. manner/spirit in which something is said); (6) I refers to instrumentalities (i.e. channels and forms); (7) N refers to norms (i.e. norms of interaction and interpretation); and (8) G refers to genres (i.e. categories of communication).

Dittmar (1976) points out that linguistic codes are not the only component of communicative competence. He argues that communicative competence also includes a whole repertoire of psychological, social, and pragmatic strategies.

The elaboration of communicative competence and the identification of its components gave sociopragmatics the new role of determining "what a speaker needs to know to be able to communicate effectively in culturally significant settings" (Rivers, 1981: 84). The possession of this kind of knowledge and the ability to use it in organizing communication had been noted as related to the degree of socialization of the speaker.

2.6. Form, Meaning, And Function

People usually use language to perform certain functions in the course of communication. These functions include requesting, arguing, ordering, inviting, ... These communicative functions are almost always carried out within a context. The speaker, on the basis of his intent, level of emotions, and relationship with the addressee, chooses a way to express his argument. He may be more direct in arguing with a friend than with a stranger.

Furthermore, the mere knowledge of meanings, forms, and functions of a particular language is insufficient for the speakers because communication is a complicated process. This knowledge should also be applicable to the negotiation of meaning. The interaction between hearers and speakers, or readers and writers makes meaning clear. In reaction to the utterances of the speaker, the hearer does provide him with feedback as to whether or not he understands what the speaker has said. This guarantees the speaker's ability to, whenever necessary, revise what he has said. It will also give the speaker some hints as to whether he should repeat himself or not.

2.7. Context

It has been repeatedly emphasized by linguists that the functions of language should be performed within a context. As such, it seems crucially important to define the term context here (cf. 2.5.)

Context is both social and interpersonal. It is social in the sense that context encompasses the internal organization of a society, its intentions, internal differences, sub-groupings, and so on. Therefore, the study of language in a social context consists

of the study of the linguistic material produced within the structure of the society. It focuses on the way in which particular characteristics of the society affect the structure of change and variation of the language spoken, and, conversely, to the way in which different attitudes about its variation affect the internal dimensions and forces of the recipient community.

The interpersonal context usually takes priority over the social context in such sub-disciplines as pragmatics, discourse analysis, conversation(al) analysis, etc. These disciplines are not devoted to understanding the interaction of the linguistic structure of the society. The focus is rather on the individuals involved in the interaction. These individuals are the speaker and the hearer, or the reader and the writer. The interpersonal context, here, is essential to the understanding of the exchanged utterances or texts. Such a context usually includes statements rooted in psychology, such as intentions, beliefs, and rationality.

2.8. Pragmatics

Compared with other branches of linguistics, pragmatics has only recently come on to the linguistic map. It nevertheless became a significant factor in linguistic thinking in the 1970's. Since then, pragmatics has developed as an important field of research. Pragmatics may be roughly described as "the study of the meaning of linguistic utterances for their users and interpreters" (Leech, and Thomas, 1985: 173).

To explain what pragmatics is, it is necessary that the concept of semiotics be explained. Charles Morris (1938) (quoted by Levinson, 1983: 1) defines pragmatics "as the scientific study of the properties of signaling systems, whether natural or artificial." In general, semiotics refers to the study within philosophy of sign and symbol systems. In this sense, the term semiotics may be just as fillingly applied to the study of artificial signs such as traffic lights, or of signs used in animal communication, as to human language. In practice, however, work in pragmatics has principally be carried out on human language, or "natural language" as logicians are accustomed to call it.

According to Rudolf Carnap (1942, 1955), semiotics is divisible into three distinct areas:

(1) Syntactics or syntax which is the study of signs in relation to one another;

(2) Semantics which is the study of signs in relation to their so-called designata or what they refer to;

(3) Pragmatics which is the study of signs or sign systems in relation to their users.

Pragmatics, however, is the Cinderella of the three areas.

Modern linguistics has been referred to as the study of language as a system of human communication. In this tradition, pragmatics has come to be applied to the study of language from the point of view of its users, especially of the choices they make, the constraints they encounter in using language in social interaction, and the effects their use of language may have on other participants in an act of communication. According to Levinson (1983: 24), pragmatics is the study of "ability of language users to pair sentences in the contexts in which they would be appropriate."

Pragmatics was born out of the abstractions of philosophy rather than of the descriptive needs of linguistics. This accounts in part for the difficulties which were later experienced by linguists when they tried to apply pragmatic models to the analysis of stretches of naturally-occurring discourse. As such, the focus of pragmatics has been on an area between semantics, sociolinguistics, and extralinguistic context. The boundaries between pragmatics and other areas have not been determined precisely (cf. Leech, 1983: 5-7; and Wierzbicka, 1991: 15-19).

Pragmatics, however, has not been without its own discrepancies. To resolve some of its oddities, several derivative terms have been proposed for the classification of the wide range of subject matters involved in pragmatics. Leech (1983: 11) draws on the term "pragma-linguistics" to refer to the study of "the more linguistic end of pragmatics -- where we consider the particular resources which a given language provides for conveying particular illocutions (namely, the speech act performed by an utterance)."

He (1983: 10) uses the term "sociopragmatics" to refer to the "sociological interface of pragmatics." In other words, sociopragmatics is the study of the way in which conditions on language use derive from the social situation. In his treatment of the "register" of pragmatics, Leech uses the term "general pragmatics" to refer to the so-called "abstract study of the general conditions of the communicative use of language, and to exclude more specific 'local' conditions on language use." Along the same lines, Crystal (1992: 310) speaks of "applied pragmatics" as the study of "verbal interaction in such domains as counseling, medical interviews, judicial sessions, where problems of communication are of critical importance." Crystal (1992: 233) refers to "literary pragmatics" as the study of the relationship of "production and reception of literary texts to their use of linguistic forms." This area of research usually involves an interaction between linguistics, literary theory, and the philosophy of language. In this tradition, such topics as the use of regional dialect, obscenity, or blasphemy in drama (in relation to their effect on the attitudes and sensibilities of reader or audience) are delved into.

In brief, pragmatics is the study of language from the point of view of the users, especially of the choice they make, the constraints they encounter in using language in social interaction, and the effects their use of language has on the other participants in the act of communication. In other words, pragmatics includes the study of: (1) how the interpretation and use of utterances depends on knowledge of real world; (2) how the relationship between the speaker and the hearer influences the structure of sentences; and (3) how speech acts are used and understood by speakers.

2.9. Pragmatic Failure

Pragmatic failure (also referred to as pragmatic error) (cf. Richards, Platt, and Platt, 1992: 127) refers to the speaker's production of wrong communicative effects through the faulty use of speech acts or one of the rules of speaking. Thomas (1983) draws on the study of sociolinguistic miscommunication. She uses the term "pragmatic failure" to refer to the inability of the individual to understand what is meant by what is said. Particularly interesting about Thomas's description of pragmatic failure is the

dichotomy between two types of pragmatic failure. She makes this distinction on the basis of the difficulty of analysis and possible remedies in terms of both the responsibility of language teachers and the responses of language learners. She calls the two categories of failure "pragmalinguistic" and "sociopragmatic" failure.

2.9.1. Pragmalinguistic Failure

The first category of "pragmatic failures" proposed by Thomas (1983) is the so-called "pragmalinguistic failure." She refrains from using the term "pragmalinguistic error" because, to her, pragmatics is not strictly formalizable. The term error, therefore, does not seem applicable here. In other words, although grammar can be judged according to prescriptive rules, the nature of pragmatic or sociopragmatic patterns is such that it is not possible to say that "the pragmatic force of an utterance is wrong. All we can say is that it failed to achieve the speaker's goal" (cited in Wolfson, 1989: 16). In this case, the learners of a language translate an utterance from their first language into the target language. The learners, however, fail to get their meaning across because the communicative conventions behind the utterances used are different. This, as Thomas points out, is more a linguistic, hence pragmalinguistic, problem than a pragmatic one because: (1) it has little to do with speaker's perception of what constitutes appropriate behavior; and (2) it has a great deal to do with knowing how to phrase a request, for instance, so that it will be interpreted as a request rather than as an information question.

2.9.2. Sociopragmatic Failure

The second type of "pragmatic failure" that Thomas identifies is what she calls "sociopragmatic failure." It has to do with knowing "what to say" and "whom to say it to." Many of the misunderstandings that occur stem from what Thomas identifies as differences in evaluation regarding what she terms "size of imposition," "tabus," "cross-culturally different assessments of relative power or social distance," and "value judgments." Thomas provides a useful way of looking at the type of diversity which exist across cultures and which often lead to cross-cultural problems. In doing so, she separates out what she sees as major areas in which there exist differences in cultural

rules regarding speech behavior.

2. 10. Speech Acts

The term "speech act" has been used by Crystal (1992: 362) to refer to a communicative activity defined with reference to the intentions of a speaker while speaking and the effects achieved on a listener. Forms of language generally serve specific communicative functions. A question like "How much does that book cost?" is usually a form functioning as a question. A question, however, can function as a request. For instance, the question "Can you pass the salt?" uttered at a dinner table does not signal the speaker's attempt at eliciting information about the listener's abilities or inabilities. It rather functions as a request for action. This manifests the fact that linguistic forms are not always unambiguous in their functions. Take the following sentence uttered by a frustrated adult who is late for work on a rainy day:

I can't find my umbrella?

This may possibly be a frantic request for all the people in the household to join in the search for the umbrella.

Communication is usually regarded as the combination of speech acts, a series of elements with purpose and intent. A good number of characteristics have been proposed for communication. These characteristics have been proposed to represent communication as being purposive, functional, and designed to bring about some effect on the environment of hearers and speakers. According to Crystal (1992: 72), communication is the transmission and reception of information between a signaler and a receiver. In other words, it is the exchange of ideas, information, etc. between two or more persons.

2. 10. 1. J. L. Austin

According to J. L. Austin (1962), communication is a series of communicative acts or speech acts. These speech acts are used systematically to accomplish particular communicative purposes.

Austin had prepared a series of lectures to be delivered at Oxford and Harvard. A posthumous reworking of these notes is the seminal book entitled *How to Do Things with Words.* In his book, Austin (1962) explores performative utterances. Consider the following utterances:

I resign.

I name this ship Boniface.

Austin argues that the nature of these utterances is in fact performative rather than constative. The meanings of these utterances are to be identified with the performance of an action. In saying "I resign," a person does in fact resign; In saying "I name this ship Boniface," the speaker actually performs the action of giving the ship a name.

Performatives are in possession of their own declarative form. In addition, they generally have well-recognized syntactic characteristics, such as a verb in the present tense, a first person subject, and the possibility of adding the adverb *hereby.* Austin's investigation of performatives led him to the conclusion that all utterances partake of the nature of actions.

According to Austin, the same utterance could at the same time constitute three kinds of acts:

(1) a locutionary act (or locution): The particular sense and reference of an utterance;
(2) an illocutionary act (or illocution): The act performed in, or by virtue of, the performance of the illocution; and
(3) a perlocutionary act (or perlocution): The act performed by means of what is said.

Austin focused on the second of these acts. The locution belongs to the traditional territory of truth-based semantics. The perlocution belongs strictly beyond the investigation of language and meaning since it deals with the results or effects of an utterance. The illocution occupies the middle ground between them. This ground is now considered the territory of pragmatics, of meaning in context. Austin emphasizes his claim that only the verbs used to describe illocutions can be used as performative verbs.

2. 10. 2. J. R. Searle

John Searle (1969) brought greater systematicity to the ideas which Austin had so perceptively explored. He focused on the idea that meaning is a kind of doing. He claimed that the study of language is just a sub-part of the theory of action. Searle crystallized the concepts of illocutionary act and illocutionary force to the extent where one can reasonably speak of his speech act theory as the classical account which functions as a point of departure for subsequent work on speech acts. The term "speech act theory" is in practice a reference to illocutionary acts.

The conditions which were required to be present if a given speech act was to be effectively performed, were used by Searle to offer definitions of various speech acts. Searle proposes four kinds of rules on the basis of these conditions:

(1) Propositional Content Rules: specify the kind of meaning expressed by the propositional part of an utterance;
(2) Preparatory Rules: delineate the conditions which are pre-requisite to the performance of the speech act;
(3) Sincerity Rules: outline the conditions which must obtain if the speech act is to be performed sincerely;
(4) Essential Rules: specify what the speech act must conventionally count as.

On the basis of these four rule types, different speech acts can be easily distinguished. In other words, speech act theory lends itself to establishing systems of classification for illocutions. Searle (1979), as an improvement of the classification of the speech acts proposed by Austin, classifies speech acts into:

a) Assertives: commit S(peaker) to the truth of some proposition;
b) Directives: count as attempts to bring about some effect through the action of H(earer);
c) Expressives: count as the expression of some psychological state;
d) Commissives: commit S to some future action;
e) Declaratives: are speech acts whose "successful" performance brings about the correspondence between the propositional content and reality.

(cf. Leech and Thomas, 1985: 179)

2. 11. Speech Act Theory

John Searle (cf. 2. 10. 2.) has been credited with the speech act theory. However, any attempt at understanding what is meant by the so-called speech act theory would be a

failure unless one distinguishes between 'speech situation', 'speech event', and 'speech acts'.

The most useful distinction between the three terms has been proposed by Hymes (1972). Within a community one finds many situations associated with speech, such as meals, parties, ... These situations, however, are not in themselves governed by consistent rules throughout. Consequently, a simple relabelling of them in terms of speech will not do much. It is, therefore, more useful to restrict the term "speech event" to activities that are directly governed by rules or norms for the use of speech. Samples of conversations occurring in such activities as private conversations, class lectures, etc. belong in this category. "Speech acts," in a narrower sense, are the minimal terms of the set "speech situation, speech event, and speech act." A speech act is an utterance which functions as a functional unit in communication. It serves as the minimal unit of analysis. Speech acts are conditioned by rules of conduct and interpretation. Acts such as giving reports, making promises, apologizing, ... belong in this category.

One significant misconception that may stem from Searle's classification of speech acts is that each conversation consists of only one single speech act. A good number of conversations, however, are multifunctional. According to Labov and Fanshel (1977: 29), "most utterances can be seen as performing several speech acts simultaneously." Conversation is not a chain of utterances, but rather a matrix of utterances and actions "bound together by a web of understanding and reactions."

Speech act theory, even though influential in a number of fields, has not been without its critics. Flowerdew (1990: 81-103) lists the most important flaws and drawbacks of the speech act theory. These flaws are perceivable in the following domains:

1) the exact number of speech acts;
2) discrete categories versus scale of meaning;
3) indirect speech acts and concept of literal force;
4) contrast between specific and diffuse acts;
5) size of speech act realization forms;
6) relation between locution, illocution, and interaction; and
7) relation between the whole and the parts in discourse.

Any account of speech act theory should never overlook the so-called felicity conditions. According to Austin (1963: 63), the term *felicity conditions* refers to the criteria which must be satisfied if a speech act is to achieve its purpose. In other words, for a speech act to be appropriately performed or realized, there are some conventions. These are referred to as felicity conditions or the so-called social conventions. The speakers and the listeners should heed these conditions to guarantee the achievement of the purposes for which any given speech act is performed.

Several types of felicity conditions have been suggested: (1) Preparatory conditions relate to whether the person performing a speech act has the authority to do so; (2) Sincerity conditions relate to the degree of sincerity with which a speech act is performed; and (3) Essential conditions relate to the way the speaker, having performed a speech act, is committed to a certain kind of belief or behavior (cf. Searle, 1981).

Speakers of a language, however, may sometimes fail to commit the felicity conditions of an utterance for one purpose or another. According to Lyons (1977: 157), the utterance "Will you drive?" is inappropriate as a request if the speaker knows that the hearer has not learnt to drive, and the mutual recognition of such inappropriateness would, in turn, lead to an interpretation of a different order (e.g. joking, sarcasm, etc.). Austin (1962) refers to such utterances as *infelicitous*.

2. 12. Approaches to the Study of Conversation

The familiar predominant kind of talk in which two or more participants freely alternate in speaking, which occurs outside specific institutional settings like religious services, law courts, classrooms, and the like, has been roughly referred to as conversation. Native languages are almost always acquired in the matrix of conversation.

Conversation has been surveyed through different approaches. The most significant of these approaches are conversation(al) analysis and discourse analysis. The focus of these two approaches is coherence (i.e. the underlying functional connectedness of a piece of language). These approaches also involve the sequential organization of

discourse, and how this organization is produced and understood. The two approaches, however, have their own distinct features.

2. 12. 1. Discourse Analysis

Crystal (1992: 106) defines discourse analysis as the "study of continuous stretches of language longer than a single sentence." Discourse analysis (also referred to as discourse linguistics) investigates the organization of such general notions as conversations, arguments, narratives, jokes, and speeches. Discourse analysis looks out in particular for linguistic features which identify the structure of the discourse.

Discourse analysis draws on the methodology, the theoretical principles, and the primitive concepts typical to linguistics. It extends the methodology and techniques of linguistics beyond the unit of the sentence. The practitioners of discourse analysis usually

a) isolate a set of basic categories or units of discourse, and
b) formulate a set of linked rules stated over those categories delimiting well-formed sequences of categories from ill-formed segments.

In the practice of discourse analysis, the analyst focuses on a number of other features as well. According to Van Dijk (1972: chaper 6), the discourse analyst usually appeals to intuitions for evaluating what is and what is not a coherent or well-formed discourse. The analyst also tends to take one or a few texts (often constructed by the analyst) and to attempt to give an analysis in depth of all the important features of this limited domain to find out what is really going on.

2. 12. 2. Conversation(al) Analysis

Conversation(al) analysis aims at the analysis of natural conversation in order to discover what the linguistic characteristics of conversations are, and how conversation is used in ordinary life. In other words, it is the analysis of the methods people use to engage in conversation and other forms of social interaction involving speech. As such, the central concern of conversational analysis is to determine how individuals experience, make sense of, and report their actions. Conversation(al) analysis includes

the study of:

(a) how speakers decide when to speak during a conversation (i.e. rules of turn-taking);
(b) how the sentences of two or more speakers are related (i.e. adjacency pairs, conversational maxims, etc.); and
(c) the different functions that a given conversation is used to perform (i.e. to establish roles, and to communicate politeness or intimacy).

Unlike discourse analysis, conversation(al) analysis is a rigorously empirical approach which avoids premature theory making. Its methods are inductive in nature. In other words, the analyst seeks to find the recurring patterns across a good number of naturally occurring conversations. He, however, does not immediately categorize restricted data (which is the typical first step in discourse analysis). Furthermore, instead of a theoretical ontology of rules (as used in syntactic descriptions), conversation(al) analysis focuses on the interactional and inferential consequences of the choice between alternative utterances.

In contrast to discourse analysis, conversation(al) analysis has little appeal to intuitive judgments as well. There is always a tendency to avoid analyses based on single texts. As many instances as possible of some particular phenomenon are examined across texts to discover the syntactic properties of the sequential organization of talk, and the way in which utterances are designed to manage such sequences.

The methodology of conversation(al) analysis, according to Crystal (1992: 84), is as follows: "Tape recordings are made of natural conversations, and the associated transcriptions are analyzed to determine the properties that govern the way a conversation proceeds."

2. 13. Conversational Principles

Work on conversational principles is usually credited to H. P. Grice (1957). Grice, like Searle, attempted to face up to the problem of how meaning in ordinary human discourse differs from meaning in the precise but limited truth-conditional sense. In other words, Grice was interested in explaining the difference between what is said and

what is meant. Grice does not assume the position of Alice at the Mad Tea-Party to believe that what is said equals what is meant, and vice-versa. He admits that "what is said" is what the words mean at their face value, and can often be explained in truth-conditional terms. "What is meant," however, is the effect that the speaker intends to produce on the addressee by virtue of the addressee's recognition of this intention. There is often a considerable gap between these two types of messages. One of them consists of only "explicit meaning," while the other contains the "inexplicit meaning" as well.

The idea behind conversational principles is the assumption that conversation proceeds according to a set of principles and maxims which interlocutors assume are being followed in the utterances of others (cf. Leech, 1983). These principles and maxims, however, are not always adhered to by the interlocutors in a conversation. They are sometimes flouted for one purpose or another.

2. 13. 1. The Cooperative Principle

To give a reasonable explanation for the process of inferring conversational meanings, one could assume that the interactants in a conversation have regard to what Grice (1957) calls the cooperative principle:

> *"Make your contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose of direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged."*

The cooperative principle (CP), stated in its most general terms above, can be expanded into four maxims:

1. Maxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true, specifically:
   (a) do not say what you believe to be false;
   (b) do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence;
2. Maxim of Quantity:
   (a) Make your contribution as informative as is required for the current purposes of the exchange;
   (b) Do not make your contribution more informative than is required;

3. Maxim of Relation: Do make your contribution relevant;
4. Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous and specifically:
   (a) avoid obscurity,
   (b) avoid ambiguity,
   (c) be brief, and
   (d) be orderly.

(cf. Leech and Thomas, 1985)

Many commentators have assumed that Grice's cooperative principle is built on some apriori notion of human benevolence and cooperativeness. They have argued that Grice is making some kind of ethical claim about human behavior (cf. Kiefer, 1979; Platt, 1977, 1982; and Sampson, 1982). But nothing is further from the truth. The cooperative principle functions as a device to explain how people arrive at meaning. There is certainly no assumption that people are inevitably truthful, informative, and relevant in what they say (see Thomas, 1986: chapter 2). In other words, a speaker may sometimes maliciously and falsely tell the hearer what he himself does not believe to be true. This flouting of a maxim can serve as a good device for leading the addressee toward a covert, implied meaning (cf. Grice, 1975). This last kind of explanation of the cooperative principle is basic to what Grice called *Conversational Implicatures*. Leech and Thomas (1985: 181) define conversational implicatures as "pragmatic implications which the addressee figures out by assuming the speaker's underlying adherence to the CP." The blatancy of the flouting of the maxims leads to the generation of a conversational implicature.

The cooperative principle has been criticized on two grounds:

1. The cooperative principle cannot, in itself, explain why people are often so indirect in conveying what they mean;
2. It fails to account for what the relationship between sense and force (considering non-directive utterances) is.

It has also been argued that the cooperative principle does not stand up to the evidence of real language use. Larkin and O'Malley (1973), for instance, argue that the majority of declarative sentences do not have an information bearing function. Keenan (1976)

believes that the maxims of the cooperative principle are not universal to language because there are linguistic communities to which not all of them apply.

2. 13. 2. The Politeness Principle

Politeness has been defined as the features of language which serve to mediate norms of social behavior, in terms of such notions as courtesy, rapport, deference, and distance. The politeness principle may be formulated as a series of maxims which people assume are being followed in the utterances of others. These maxims include:

1. do not impose;
2. give options;
3. make your receiver feel good.

(cf. Lakeoff, 1973: 199)

Clearly the politeness principle and the cooperative principle are often in conflict with each other. There is mutual incompatibility between politeness and truth as well as politeness and brevity. People are usually conscious of such collisions between the two principles. The term "white lie" has been desperately coined in an attempt to manifest the surrender of truth to politeness.

The observation of politeness often results in the speaker's use of indirect speech acts. These are, according to Searle (1979), *cases in which one illocutionary act is performed indirectly, by way of another*. Sadock (1974) has coined the terms "whimperatives" and "quaclaratives" to indicate the apparent hybrid status or the indirectness of imperatives and declarations respectively.

It is important to note, however, that not all writers are using the term politeness in the same way. Grice and Searle (and Brown and Levinson (1987)) are principally concerned with politeness as an underlying motivation for indirectness. Leech (1983), however, is concerned with politeness as a surface-level adherence to social norms. Politeness, according to Leech (1983), does not need to have anything to do with any genuine desire to be pleasant to one's interactants. According to Brown and Levinson (1987), the degree of mitigation required depends on three factors:

1. Social distance (i.e. a composite of psychologically real factors such as age, sex, intimacy, etc.);
2. Relative power (i.e. usually resulting from social and economical status);
3. Size of imposition.

All these factors have to be weighted in relation to the cultural cotext and all should be considered as potentially negotiable within interactions, rather than as givens. The politeness principle has a regulative role rather than the aim of creating and maintaining social relationships.

2. 14. The Notion of Face

In communication between two or more persons, the positive image or impression of oneself that one shows or intends to show to the other participant is called face. In any social meeting between people, the participants attempt to communicate a positive image of themselves which reflects the values and beliefs of the participants. For example, Alice's face during a particular meeting might be that of a sophisticated, intelligent, witty, and educated person. If this image is not accepted by the other participants, feelings may be hurt, and there will be consequent loss of face. Social contacts between people thus involve what has been called *face-work* by Goffman (1959). According to Goffman, the term face-work refers to the efforts by participants to communicate a positive face and to prevent loss of face.

According to Brown and Levinson (1978), two aspects of people's feelings are involved with face. The first is the desire of the individual not to be imposed on. They have used the term negative face to refer to this aspect of people's feelings. The second, however, is the desire of the individual to be liked or approved of. This was referred to as positive face. In deciding how much to take another person's feelings into account, three factors must be considered:

1. People are usually more polite to others who are distant;
2. People are generally more polite to others when they are of higher status or are perceived as being powerful;
3. People are usually more polite in relation to the gravity of the threat they are about to make to the other's face.

Politeness, therefore, is the manifestation of respect for another's face. Positive politeness involves strategies that let the addressee know s/he is liked and approved of. Positive politeness signals to the addressee that s/he is considered a friend or a member of the speaker's in-group. Negative politeness, on the other hand, involves a show of deference and an assurance that the speaker does not wish to disturb or to interfere with the other's freedom.

Many communicative acts inherently threaten the face needs of one or both participants. These are usually referred to as face-threatening acts (or FTA's). When contemplating performance of an FTA, speakers may select from among the following five general strategies:

1. A speaker may perform the FTA "baldly," without making any attempt to acknowledge the hearer's face wants;
2. A speaker may perform the FTA while attending to the hearer's positive face wants, using what Brown and Levinson (1987) label a positive politeness strategy;
3. A speaker may go off-record in performing the FTA. The speaker performs the act in such a vague manner that could be interpreted by the hearer as some other act;
4. A speaker may perform the FTA with negative politeness, acknowledging the hearer's negative face wants, the desire to be unimpeded and not imposed on;
5. A speaker may avoid doing the FTA altogether. The speaker does not perform the FTA at all.

(cf. Brown and Levinson, 1987: 103-210)

2. 15. Studies on Invitations

Work on invitations has been mainly the focus of those who sought to study native speaker's lack of recognition of their own speech patterns. According to Wolfson (1979b), and Wolfson, et al. (1983), the knowledge of how to give, interpret, and respond to invitations is an aspect of communicative competence which is critical to those who wish to interact socially. This knowledge is particularly significant to non-native EFL learners in the host speech community. Hatch (1978) argues that the language learner is most likely to do best when s/he is provided with frequent opportunities to interact with the native speakers of the target language.

In order for any interaction, even the most frequent, formal, and superficial one to take place, social arrangements of one sort or another need to be made somehow. This goal is accomplished by middle-class Americans mainly through extending invitations (cf. Wolfson,1989). In their study of invitations, Wolfson, et al. observe that since speech communities around the world vary greatly with regard to the rules that constraint speech behavior, the non-native speakers cannot hope to interact effectively in the target speech community unless they learn its rules. In this case, the rules for the appropriate management of invitations are well below the conscious awareness of speakers. Based on these points, they conclude that the only way that the rules for giving and responding to invitations among speakers of American English can be analyzed and made available to language learners is through the empirically based descriptive analysis.

In their study of invitations, Wolfson, et al. (cf. Wolfson, 1989) drew on observation as the naturalistic method of collecting data. They recorded their observations and gathered as much information as possible concerning the so-called dependent variables such as the age, sex, occupation, and the relationship of interlocutors involved in these invitation exchanges. Relationship of interlocutors has been shown in study after study to be significantly critical to what is said and how it is said and responded to. However, it is not clear what is meant by interlocutors' relationship. In order to quantify this point, these scholars have found it most useful to begin by viewing the relationship of interlocutors on a continuum of social distance from intimates to strangers. In order to quantify the term intimacy, they draw on membership in a "nuclear family" as a possible feature. They, however, are not heedless of the point that the type of relationship between husband and wife, for instance, differs greatly from that of parents and children or even siblings. This points up to the fact that the social distance continuum should be seen in terms of ranges and not of discrete points. It must also be recognized that social distance, being a cover term, interacts with such factors as age, sex, ethnic background, relative status, etc. Asymmetrical status relationships pertain to the minimum range of social distance continuum. Service encounters, however, are

examples of situations in which one could find the maximum range of social distance.

With this picture in mind, Wolfson, et al. started the analysis of the data on invitations. They believe that social commitments, according to popular wisdom, are normally arrived at by unambiguous invitations. In their operational definition of the term invitation, they assert:

> " ... such a speech act ... contains reference to time and/or mention of place or activity, and, most important, a request for response."
>
> (cited by Wolfson, 1989: 119)

The request for response can come before or after the mention of time or activity. Like many other conversational interactions, context frequently substitutes for words in giving some of the information to be communicated. The request for response could also be signaled by question intonation alone. All these points enable the speaker to extend invitations which are, even though no longer than a single word, perfectly understood. The word "Saturday?" uttered by a woman as part of a leave-taking sequence could be interpreted as a perfect invitation on the grounds that it is well known to both participants in this interaction that this single utterance referred to the fact that the two women and their husbands were in the habit of spending most Saturday evenings together.

The context, the shared knowledge of the interactants, and the question intonation are three important factors that affect most, if not all, invitation exchanges. Among intimates where a great deal of contextual knowledge is shared, one-word invitations, like the above example are not uncommon. Even though they contain all the information necessary to perform the function intended, non-native speakers of the language treat such speech acts as "truncated" ones which may, on the surface, seem hardly to qualify as speech acts. The utterances are referred to as minimal invitation forms.

Wolfson, et al. (1983) provide a pattern for invitations they collected through the observation of middle-class American behavior. The vast majority of social

engagements, according to their data, are arrived at by a process of negotiation whereby the interlocutors move turn by turn until a social commitment has been reached. They use the term *lead* to refer to the statement or question which signals the addressee that an invitation will follow if s/he makes the appropriate responses.

Based on their function, leads are categorized into three categories:

1) The first type of lead is the most obvious in terms of letting the addressee know what can be expected to follow. The function of this beginning to a sequence is to establish the availability of the addressee. This lead type may appear in the form of a question/statement which is meant to elicit not only the desired information but also information about the addressee's availability at a particular time;

2) The second type of lead is much less obviously the beginning of an invitation sequence. It is referred to as *expressive* because it usually seeks to convey the feelings of the speaker without any specific commitment. The vagueness of this lead type stimulates some native speakers to refrain from considering it as a lead at all. However, this type of lead is quite frequent and usually ends in a definite invitation;

3) The third type of lead is referred to as the *past tie*. This lead type is related to some shared knowledge of past attempt to negotiate a social arrangement by the interlocutors, or by someone solely associated who is not present at the moment of speaking. This type of lead usually makes it possible for interlocutors to refer to some previous discussion which did not end in a complete invitation, while still leaving the matter open for further negotiation and a possible refusal by the addressee.

(cf. Wolfson, 1989: 120)

In brief, a lead has one of the following four functions:

a) Expressing the speaker's feelings;
b) Determining the availability of the addressee;
c) Referring to a past tie;

d) Reaffirming a relationship by suggesting a future meeting.

In any case, a lead will normally contain at least one of the components of an unambiguous invitation (i.e. reference to time and/or mention of place, mention of activity, and a request for response).

2. 16. Studies on Ostensible Invitations

To date, two significant studies have been carried out with the aim of examining the so-called ostensible invitations. The first of these studies concerns itself with what it calls *Ambiguous Invitations*. The second study focuses on, and emphasizes the importance of what has been referred to as *Ostensible Invitations*.

2. 16. 1. Study One: Ambiguous Invitations

The first serious study of ostensible invitations in English was carried out by Wolfson, et al. (1983). In their analysis of invitation formulas, they noticed that, as part of American speech behavior, many leads occur without invitations. In other words, speakers of American English may quite frequently express the desirability or even the necessity of arranging a social commitment. These expressions are, however, not followed by the conclusion of the arrangement under discussion. It is a moot point as to whether such commitments were ever intended to be completed.

The reoccurrence of some of these invitation-free leads has given them the status of formulas. They are immediately recognizable by the following features:

1) Time is always left indefinite;
2) A response is not required;
3) A modal auxiliary like "must," "should," or "have to" is almost always used.

(cf. Wolfson, 1989: 122)

In order to signal to the listener that the lead may not result in an invitation, the speaker may use time expressions like "soon," "one day," or "sometime," and any of the indefinite phrases beginning with "when" (e.g., "Let's have lunch together when things settle down."). The native speakers often treat these expressions as polite 'brush off', or

a way of expressing interest in continuing the relationship without making any definite commitment for future meeting.

Wolfson, et al. (1983) in their study argue that the non-native speaker, in order to be able to understand and appreciate the role of the lead, must always remember that middle-class Americans belong in a variety of groups or networks, each connected with certain aspects of their lives.

Usually these groups are overlapping. Therefore, the individual may, often for one reason or another, move into or out of these groups. In other words, it is very difficult to keep up with old friends and acquaintances, however much one might wish to do so. It often happens, however, that a situation may arise in which people who have lost touch with one another are brought together. Friends or relatives may meet by chance at parties, street corners, or even stores. It is usually perceivable that in these situations a conversation may ensue. A nostalgic wish for a renewal of the relationship is aroused and expressed. Neither participants, however, regard this sort of expression as a binding invitation.

Thus, it often happens that a lead, although seemingly welcomed by the addressee, never develops beyond the talking stage. Misunderstandings are inevitable in these situations. The non-native speaker may treat all such conversations as actual invitations, while they are not really so. Far from being insincere or unfriendly, it might well be the case that "many Americans, however informal and seemingly open in their interactional style, are in reality quite hesitant to themselves in a position to be refused" (Wolfson, 1989: 124).

2. 16. 2. Study Two: Ostensible Invitations

Clark and Isaacs (1990) carried out a research project on the so-called ostensible invitations. According to these scholars, native speakers of American English often extend invitations they do not intend to be taken seriously. They argue that the aim of such invitations is not to establish invitations but to accomplish some other unstated

purpose. The term "ostensible acceptance" has been used by these scholars to define the positive response of the invitee to such invitations. Take the following example:

> Mary: *Let's do lunch sometime.*
> Justin: *Yes, let's.*

Mary's utterance is an example of ostensible invitations. Justin's response is an example of ostensible acceptances. Clark and Isaacs (1990) believe that ostensible invitations belong in a category of speech acts which they called ostensible speech acts.

Traditional theories of speech acts are not flawless in that they define invitations as a speaker's (S) inviting a hearer (H) to an event (E) only if S requests H's presence and promises acceptance of his or her presence (cf. Bach and Harnish, 1979: 51). By this analysis, Mary's invitation is insincere because she doe not really want Justin to come to lunch. According to Clark and Isaacs (1990), it is not right to describe this invitation as insincere. It is not like a lie. A lie is an insincere assertion primarily meant to deceive the hearer. Mary's invitation, however, is not insincere because both Mary and Justin mutually believe they both "recognize it for what it is (only ostensibly an invitation and actually something else)." In other words, there is a kind of mutually recognized pretense in this type of invitation.

In order to pinpoint the defining properties and the characteristic features of ostensible invitations, Clark and Isaacs collected a repertoire of 156 invitation exchanges. Fifty-two undergraduates taking a course in psycholinguistics were required to record an instance of one sincere and one insincere invitation or offer they witnessed. Forty other examples were gathered from face-to-face interviews with ten undergraduates who would remember two sincere and two insincere invitations of their own experience. Ten examples were also gathered in face-to-face interviews with ten pairs of friends at Stanford University. The two final examples were recorded from spontaneous telephone calls between Ellen A. Isaacs and two different friends.

The authors, then, analyzed their data to understand what possible properties make ostensible invitations distinguishable from genuine invitations. A meticulous analysis of

the data revealed five important points about ostensible invitations:

(1) Pretense: The inviter, in ostensible invitations, is only pretending to extend a sincere invitation. Mary, in the above example, is only pretending to invite Justin to lunch;

(2) Mutual Recognition: Inviters intend their pretense to be vividly recognized by them and their addressee. This is called mutual recognition. Mary intended Justin and herself to mutually believe they both recognize that she was only pretending to make a sincere invitation. Mutual recognition is highly significant in that it distinguishes ostensible invitations from genuine but sincere ones;

(3) Collusion: Invitees are intended to collude with the inviters on the pretense by responding in kind. In other words, they are intended to respond in a way which is appropriate to the pretense. In the above example, the response is appropriate to the pretense. The invitee may sometimes offer ostensible excuses, or reasons why s/he supposedly could not make it;

(4) Ambivalence: If inviters were asked , "Do you really mean it?" they could not honestly answer either yes or no. This is a paradoxical point in relation to ostensible invitations. Ambivalence usually differentiates between ostensible speech acts and other forms of non-serious speech uses like joking, irony, etc;

(5) Off-record Purpose: Ostensible invitations are extended as a way of expressing certain intentions off-record. Any given utterance has a set of vivid implications which the speaker can be held accountable for. These implications are said to be on record. There are, on the other hand, certain other plausible but not necessary implications for which the speaker cannot be held accountable. These are referred to as off-record (cf. Brown and Levinson, 1978). An ostensible invitation in this case may be a means of testing the waters to see how the invitee might react.

As such, ostensible invitations have two layers: a top-layer at which the inviter issues an invitation and the invitee responds in kind; and a bottom-layer at which they both take

the collusive actions towards each other with the mutual recognition that the top-layer is only a pretense. The feature general to ostensible invitations is that the inviter shows his/her ambivalence about the invitee's acceptance, and that the invitee shows her/his recognition of that ambivalence. Unlike Wolfson (1989), Clark and Isaacs refrain from referring to these invitations as ambiguous. They believe that because they are designed so that addressees will recognize the pretense, ostensible invitations are not intended to be ambiguous. They may appear ambiguous to the analyst, but by no means to the addressee. The pretense, no doubt, is meant to be recognized.

In order to make the pretense of the invitation vivid, there are a number of strategies that may be used in extending invitations. Based on their data, Clark and Isaacs could find seven different ways of making the pretense obvious:

(1) A makes B's presence at event E implausible. To do so, the inviter usually sets out to violate the felicity conditions needed for establishing genuine invitations. The felicity conditions for invitations are: (a) A must believe B would like to be present at E; and (b) A must be able to provide what s/he offers. By violating these conditions, B will have enough grounds to believe the invitation is insincere. However, if the violation is obvious for both of them, the invitation is ostensible. According to Atkinson and Drew (1984), and Levinson (1983), inviters often use questions or utterances the primary purpose of which is to establish the felicity conditions for invitations to follow. They call these utterances "preinvitations." Wolfson (1981, 1989) calls them leads (cf. 2. 16. 1.). With genuine invitations, these preinvitations are used in an ordinary way to establish a favorable condition for the invitation. With ostensible invitations, however, they will establish unfavorable conditions. This will highlight the pretense of these invitations.

(2) A invites B only after B has solicited the invitation. B can solicit invitations in two ways: through the context or directly. In the former case,

B can take advantage of the cultural connotations of politeness formulas. For instance, in American culture, it is always impolite to exclude some members of a group from an event. B, if excluded, can ask a question which will highlight B's exclusion. In the latter case, B explicitly requests an invitation if s/he believes that A cannot or will not anticipate B's desire to be present at event E.

(3) A does not motivate the invitation beyond social courtesy. If the invitation is genuine, A usually uses utterances to make the invitation more attractive. In other words, A tries to induce B's acceptance of the invitation. With ostensible invitations, however, A does not motivate the invitation, whereby making the pretense vivid.

(4) A does not persist or insist on the invitation. In genuine invitations, A usually repeats the invitation several times. With ostensible invitations, A usually fails to pursue the invitation upon B's very first refusal to accept.

(5) A is vague about the arrangements. Unless they are established by the situation and the shared knowledge of the interactants, A must specify the time and place of the E for B (cf. 2. 15.). A common feature of ostensible invitations is the vagueness of such logistics. In the above example between Mary and Justin, "sometime" is not sufficient to ensure that Justin and Mary will be at the same place at the same time.

(6) A hedges the invitation to B. A can show that his/her heart is not really in it by hedging the invitation with such expressions as "well," "I guess," "I mean," etc.

(7) A delivers the invitation with inappropriate cues. Usually genuine invitations are very vivid and crystal clear. Ostensible invitations, however, are fraught with inappropriate cues such as hesitations, pauses, down-casting of the eyes, rapid speech, and other non-verbal signs that

manifest the pretense of the invitation.

It should, however, be noted that these seven features are not independent of each other. There are, in fact, examples of invitations in which two or more of these have been used by the inviter simultaneously.

2. 17. Final Remark

The primary aim of this chapter is to give the reader an understanding of the issues which will be called on in the following chapters. In other words, this chapter will serve as a pedestal upon which the rest of this study will be founded.

CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

3. 0. Introduction

The following questions are the focus of this chapter: (1) Do Farsi ostensible invitations observe all of the defining properties of English ostensible invitations or not? (2) Do Farsi inviters take advantage of the same strategies in their extending ostensible invitations as their English counterparts do? This chapter also aims at exploring the following issues respectively: (1) defining the key terms and concepts used throughout the study for clarifying the study; (2) introducing the subjects of the study; (3) describing the materials used in the study; (4) outlining the characteristics of the data; and (5) explaining the procedures of data analysis.

3. 1. Terms And Concepts

This study, as its title suggests, is concerned with determining the sociopragmatic features of ostensible invitations in Farsi in terms of the universals of pragmatics. To this end, a repertoire of terms and concepts have been used which serve the purpose of clarifying as well as quantifying the study.

The term "invitation" has been used in two different senses in this study. On the one hand, some invitations have been termed "genuine invitations." On the other hand, some other invitation exchanges have been referred to as "ostensible invitations." According to A. A. Dehkhoda (1955), "genuine invitations" can be operationally defined as :

> *" A speaker (A) invites a hearer (B) to receive something or to do some task."*

This definition is not flawless in that it does not distinguish between "imperatives" and "genuine invitations." Imperatives, after all, invite somebody (B) to do some task. Since no other operational definition of genuine invitations in Farsi could be found, it was decided that a modified version of this definition be used in the analysis and quantification of the data of this study. Our operational definition of the term "genuine

invitation," therefore, would be:

> *A speaker (A) invites a hearer (B) to receive something or to perform some task the primary aim of which is to benefit the hearer himself/herself.*

This definition distinguishes between invitations and imperatives. It is easily perceivable that the primary aim of imperatives is to benefit the speaker not the hearer.

Ostensible invitations in Farsi have been defined by the same definition as Clark and Isaacs (1990) used in their study of English ostensible invitations. This is significant in that it not only makes the data of this study readily quantifiable, but it also relates the study to the so-called "linguistic universals." As such, ostensible invitations in Farsi are defined as:

> *A speaker (A) invites a hearer (B) to an event (E) the aim of which is not to establish the invitation but to accomplish some other, unstated purpose. (cf. 2. 16. 2.)*

In the analysis of the data for this study, those examples of invitations that would correspond to all the five features of ostensible invitations in English (pretense, ambivalence, mutual recognition, collusion, and off-record purpose) were treated as ostensible. Other instances of invitations which did not go with these five features were treated as genuine invitations (no matter sincere or insincere) (cf. 3. 5.).

All other terms used in this study are assumed to be defined as they have been defined in English. There are, however, two exceptions: age, and economical status.

In order to quantify the "age" variable, three distinct age groups (on the basis of the consensus of the members of the speech community) have been decided upon. The first of these age groups has been termed "young." It includes people who are between 15 years to 30 years old. People with the age of less than 15 years are excluded on the grounds that they are not normally authorized enough (in their families) to extend invitations. The second age group which has been termed "adult" includes people with the age range of 30 to 45 years. The last age group in this study is referred to as "old." This age group includes people who are more than 45 years old.

The third set of definitions which are of great significance in this study have to do with the so-called "social class" variable. In order to classify them into different social classes, sociolinguists commonly focus on the economical status of the members of speech community. Therefore, on the basis of the amount of money (in Rials) which they make monthly (cf. Wardhaugh, 1986: 46, 132, 140-145), the subjects of this study are classified into three distinct classes: low class, mid class, and high class. The "low class" includes people whose income does not exceed 100,000 Rials monthly. The "mid class" members, however, make an income between 100,000 and 350,000 Rials monthly. The third group (i.e. the high class) gains an income of more than 350,000 Rials each month. It is highly important to note that these figures serve only-and-only the purpose of quantifying the data for this study. They are by no means reliable for putting such labels as "rich," "poor," etc. on people.

3. 2. Subjects

The subjects of this study belong to three different groups. The first group consists of people who have been observed (by the field workers who helped me collect the data) to extend invitations. This group includes 1282 pairs of interlocutors belonging in different jobs, age-groups, economical and social backgrounds, etc. In the analysis of the data, however, 109 pairs of these people were excluded because their utterances did not have a genuine/ostensible counterpart (cf. 3. 5.).

The second group of subjects consists of people who have been interviewed by the writer. This group, in turn, is composed of two sub-groups. 34 randomly chosen undergraduate students at Yazd University were asked to recall two sincere and two insincere invitations from their own experience. One was to involve a friend and the other an acquaintance or a stranger. All these subjects were the invitees in the exchanges they recalled. Along the same lines, 41 pairs of friends at the same university were asked (in face-to-face interviews) to recall a time when one had made an ostensible invitation to the other.

3. 3. Materials

This study aims at exploring the probable universal aspects of ostensible invitations. It,

therefore, draws on the materials which are in consonance with this end. Besides the books and articles which were used in the process of reviewing the related literature, an article entitled "Ostensible Invitations" was also used in this study. In order to find the probable sociopragmatic universals that control human speech behavior in terms of invitations, I made sure to carry out this study in such a way as to ensure maximum consonance with the study carried out by Clark and Isaacs (1990) on ostensible invitations in English.

3. 4. Methods And Data

One set of 1282 examples was collected by 45 undergraduates taking the course *Principles of Research.* They were asked to record any instance of sincere and/or insincere invitations or offers they witnessed and also report the purpose behind the exchange. They were asked to describe enough of the context to make the conversation comprehensible and to quote, as best as they could, exactly what was said, including just before and just after the invitation. The advantage of the examples collected this way is that they reflect a range of people observing spontaneous instances in a variety of naturalistic settings. Of this set of 1282 examples, 109 instances were discarded either because they were not invitations, or did not provide enough context or descriptions (cf. 3.5.). The rest of the instances included 566 ostensible and 607 genuine exchanges.

A second set of 136 examples was gathered from face-to-face interviews with 34 undergraduates. Each student was asked to recall two sincere and two insincere invitations extended towards him/her. One was to involve a friend and the other an acquaintance or a stranger. These students were then asked to describe the context, to reenact the dialogue as best as they could, and then to explain why they believed the act had been sincere or not. These interviews were designed to afford more details of the incidents, especially on the issue of sincerity versus insincerity. This process afforded 68 ostensible and 68 genuine exchanges.

A third set of 41 examples was also gathered in face-to-face interviews with 41 pairs of friends at Yazd University. They were asked to recall a time when one had extended an ostensible invitation to the other. After they had agreed on the incident but before they

had discussed it in any detail, they were individually interviewed in isolation. Each of them gave their version of the context and reenacted the dialogue as best as they could. Then they were asked to rate their confidence that they mutually believed the invitation was not intended to be taken seriously, with (1) being low confidence and (7) high. These subjects described what they thought had been expressed through the invitation and rated their confidence that this interpretation had been mutually understood. The accuracy of this method is higher than other methods because each interactant recalls his/her words (cf. Hjelmquist and Gidlund, 1985; Ross and Sicoly, 1979). This method afforded 41 examples of ostensible invitations.

3. 5. Data Analysis

The data suggests that ostensible invitations constitute a coherent class of speech acts. These speech acts are identifiable by a small number of properties (cf. 2. 16. 2.). In the analysis of the data, any exchange which goes by all the five features or properties of ostensible invitations was treated as ostensible.

In order to quantify the data for purposes of comparing the two classes of invitations, it was necessary to draw on an objective and exact method of quantification and analysis. According to Bernard Spolsky (1990), the history of language teaching is sometimes written as though it follows a simple progression. However, analysis shows that this view is flawed for three reasons: (1) new theories do not generally succeed in replacing their predecessors but continue to coexist with them uncomfortably; (2) theories have not usually been realized in new methods; and (3) teaching practice continued as a loosely eclectic amalgam of old habits with new garnishes. One of the big disappointments in the study of language has, for some people, been the failure of linguists and psychologists to form the genuine interdisciplinary team. According to Spolsky:

> There is a great advantage in a general theory, one with the widest possible scope .... Thus, I would expect a general theory to include anything that can reasonably be considered relevant .... There is, it will be noted, a healthy and unusually polite acceptance of the possibility of pluralism ... a willingness to concede that different models might be

> needed for different aspects of the problem ....
> (cf. *TESOL Quarterly*, 1990, 24 (4): 609-615)

The quotation from Spolsky reveals that any attempt at theory-making (especially in terms of linguistic universals) would be a failure unless different studies are viewed as belonging to a collectivity. Therefore, exactly the same method as was used by Clark and Isaacs (1990) was applied to analysis of the data for this study. This method has to do with the frequencies of the *seven* interrelated features that speakers exploit in the process of extending ostensible invitations. These features are ones that appear predominantly in insincere as opposed to genuine invitations (cf. 2. 16. 2). The percentages and the statistical tests reported in chapter four of this thesis are all based on 675 ostensible and 675 genuine invitations collected from the observations and the interviews (cf. Appendix A).

In order to interpret the data in terms of such variables as sex, age, and economical status (since it was argued by many scholars in the field that these variables affect human speech behavior (cf. chapter 2)), it was necessary that the subjects of this study be equal in number in terms of these variables. In other words, any interpretation based on two non-homogeneous groups of subjects would be faulty. To this end, the following steps were taken:

a) Some instances were discarded from the data. Those exchanges which did not go by the defining features and properties of their English counterparts were excluded. Some other examples were also discarded because they did not provide enough context;

b) Carrying out such statistical measures as the chi-square test calls for the same total number of subjects in all the subgroups. Therefore, interview was used as the method of data collection. This was specifically useful in that it would not only make the study similar to the one carried out by Clark and Isaacs, but it would also make up for the differences in the frequencies of subjects in terms of the above-mentioned variables (i.e. sex, age, social class);

c) Only the inviter (in any exchange) was viewed as the subject of the study.

Those instances of the data which did not comply with the *five* defining properties of ostensible invitations would probably belong in either the "genuine invitation" class or some other speech act. In order to determine in which class these utterances belonged, they were put to native speakers' judgement (cf. De Saussure). Those instances which were identified as genuine invitations were retained in a category with the same name. The rest of the instances which were labeled (by native speakers) as some other speech act were excluded.

CHAPTER FOUR
DATA ANALYSIS

4.0. Introduction

As it was stated in chapter one, the present study addresses the following questions:

(1) whether Farsi ostensible invitations go by the defining properties and features of ostensible invitations in English; and

(2) whether native speakers of Farsi draw on the same strategies in their extending ostensible invitations as their English counterparts do.

It was also noted that, for the quantification and analysis of the data for this study, the properties and features of English ostensible invitations were replicated in chapter three. As such, this chapter aims at:

(1) Providing sample ostensible invitations for purposes of exemplifying their defining features and properties;

(2) Providing tables for purposes of data analysis; and

(3) Discussing the tables and reporting the findings of the study.

4.1. Defining Properties of Ostensible Invitations

> It was Saturday morning. The students had to go to the university in order to attend their classes. Maryam (a senior student majoring in English) got on the bus. It was crowded. There was no empty seat for her. Shohreh (another student and Maryam's friend) was also in the bus.
>
> Shohre: *boland sham benshini?*
> (Let me stand up for you (to sit)?)
> Maryam: *na, na. raahat baash.*
> (No, be comfortable!)

In the above example, Shohre seems to have extended a genuine invitation. Analyzed in terms of the following five features, however, her utterance should be considered as an instance of ostensible invitations (members of the speech community also supported this claim).

(1) *Pretense:* The inviter, in ostensible invitations, is only pretending to extend a sincere invitation. Shohre, in the above example, is only pretending to invite Maryam to take the seat;

(2) *Mutual Recognition:* Inviters intend their pretense to be vividly recognized by them and their addressee. This is called mutual recognition. Shohre intended Maryam and herself to mutually believe they both recognize that she was only pretending to make a sincere invitation. Mutual recognition is highly significant in that it distinguishes ostensible invitations from genuine but insincere ones;

(3) *Collusion:* Invitees are intended to collude with the inviters on the pretense by responding in kind. In other words, they are intended to respond in a way which is appropriate to the pretense. In the above example, the response is appropriate to the pretense. The invitee may sometimes offer ostensible excuses, or reasons why s/he supposedly could not make it. The reply uttered by Maryam in the above example is an attempt at colluding with Shohre on the pretense of her invitation;

(4) *Ambivalence*: If inviters were asked , "Do you really mean it?" they could not honestly answer either yes or no. This is a paradoxical piont in relation to ostensible invitations. Ambivalence usually differentiates between ostensible speech acts and other forms of non-serious speech uses like joking, irony, etc;

(5) *Off-record Purpose:* Ostensible invitations are extended as a way of expressing certain intentions off-record. Any given utterance has a set of vivid implications which the speaker can be held accountable for. These implications are said to be on record. There are, on the other hand, certain other plausible but not necessary implications for which the speaker cannot be held accountable. These are referred to as off-record (cf. Brown and Levinson, 1978). An ostensible invitation in this case may be a means of testing the waters to see how the invitee might react.

In the analysis of the data for the present study, 1459 collected exchanges were compared against these five properties of ostensible invitations. Of this set, 109

exchanges were discarded because they did not provide enough context. Of the remaining repertoire of 1350 exchanges, a set of 675 exchanges qualified as ostensible. The rest of the exchanges were categorized into a set of 675 genuine exchanges.

4.2. Establishing Invitations As Ostensible

The basic idea in designing an ostensible invitation is to make its pretense at sincerity obvious enough that the addressee will recognize that it was intended to be seen as obvious. In order to make the pretense at sincerity vivid, there are a number of strategies that may be used in extending invitations. According to Clark and Isaacs (1990), the strategies that the inviters draw on in order to make their pretense at sincerity clear could be categorized into seven classes (cf. 2.16.2.). In consonance with the work of Clark and Isaacs on ostensible invitations in English and for purposes of quantifying the data, all the exchanges gathered as the data for this study were checked against the following seven features (See Graph A).



The statistical tests I report were based on the 675 ostensible and 675 genuine

invitations collected through observations and the individual interviews. (See appendix A for breakdown of the data by feature.)

(1) *A makes B's presence at event E implausible.* To do so, the inviter usually sets out to violate the felicity conditions needed for establishing genuine invitations. The felicity conditions for invitations are: (a) A must believe B would like to be present at E; and (b) A must be able to provide what s/he offers. By violating these conditions, B will have enough grounds to believe the invitation is insincere. However, if the violation is obvious for both of them, the invitation is ostensible (cf. Atkinson and Drew, 1984, and Levinson, 1983). For example, if A invites B to an event when they mutually believe that B has other unbreakable plans, B would have some reason to believe that the invitation was ostensible:

> It was Monday afternoon. Mr. Qoreishi was going to Yazd. He wanted to get off the bus in Meybod (in Yazd Province). The driver, Mr. Sanobar, however, had to continue his journey for another fifty kilometers to reach Yazd. When he wanted to get off, Mr. Qoreishi said:
>
> Mr. Qoreishi: *tashrif biyaarid berim manzel shaam dar xedmatetun baashim.*
> (Come over to our house for dinner!)
>
> Mr. Sanobar: *xeyli mamnun. zahmat midim.*
> (Thank you. We will bother you.)

In my corpus, the preparatory conditions were defective in 85.18% (575) of the ostensible invitations, but in only 28% (189) of the genuine ones. The result of the comparison of ratios supported the hypothesis that:

H_1 (P_1>P_2): *There is a meaningful difference between the preparatory conditions that affect ostensible and genuine invitations.*

$Z_{0.05}$=1.645
$Z_{observed}$=21.15 21.15>>1.645 therefore P_1>P_2

In 445 of these ostensible exchanges, A knew that B could not come to event E. In another 15, A knew that B would have almost no interest in coming. And in 115 others, A could not practically provide what had been offered.



(2) *A invites B only after B has solicited the invitation.* B can solicit invitations in two ways: through the context or directly. In the former case, B can take advantage of the cultural connotations of politeness formulas. For instance, in Iranian culture, it is always impolite to exclude some members of a group from an event. B, if excluded, can ask a question which will highlight B's exclusion. In the latter case, B explicitly requests an invitation if s/he believes that A cannot or will not anticipate B's desire to be present at event E.

> Mr. Naqibi is the principal of a high school. One day, during the break, Mr. Jafari, one of the teachers, enters the school office. After greeting other people in the office, he says:
>
> Mr. Jafari: *bebaxshid ?aaqaay-e Naqibi ke hich vaqt maa raa davat nemikonid naahaar.*
> (Excuse us, Mr. Naqibi, for not inviting us to lunch!)
> Mr. Naqibi: *?emruz hamegi tashrif biyaarid.*
> (Come over today, all of you!)

In the sample, 60.59% (409) of the ostensible invitations were extended only after they were solicited . However, only 2.37% (16) of the genuine invitations were solicited. The result of the comparison of ratios supported the hypothesis that:

H_2 (P_1>P_2): *There is a meaningful difference between ostensible and genuine invitations in terms of solicitation.*

$Z_{0.05}$=1.645
$Z_{observed}$=23.28 23.28>>1.645 therefore $P_1>P_2$



(3) *A does not motivate the invitation beyond social courtesy.* If the invitation is genuine, A usually uses utterances to make the invitation more attractive. In other words, A tries to induce B's acceptance of the invitation. With ostensible invitations, however, A does not motivate the invitation, whereby making the pretense vivid. In my corpus, 73.62% (497) of the ostensible invitations were not motivated beyond social courtesy. However, 2.96% (20) of the genuine invitations were not motivated. The hypothesis:

H_3 ($P_1>P_2$): *There is a meaningful difference between the degree of motivating for ostensible and genuine invitations.*

was supported by the comparison of ratios.

$Z_{0.05}$=1.645
$Z_{observed}$=27.19 27.19>>1.645 therefore $P_1>P_2$

(4) *A does not persist or insist on the invitation.* In genuine invitations, A usually repeats the invitation several times. With ostensible invitations, A usually fails to

pursue the invitation upon B's very first refusal to accept. In my corpus, in 618 (91.55%) of ostensible and 3 (0.44%) of genuine invitations A fails to issue a second invitation.

H_4 (P_1>P_2): *There is a meaningful difference between the degree of persistence for ostensible and genuine invitations.*



Here, again, the result of the comparison of ratios supports the hypothesis.

$Z_{0.05}$=1.645
$Z_{observed}$=16.39 16.39>>1.645 therefore P_1>P_2

(5) *A is vague about the arrangements.* Unless they are established by the situation and the shared knowledge of the interactants, A must specify the time and place of the E for B (cf. 2. 15.). A common feature of ostensible invitations is the vagueness of such logistics. In the sample, in 36 (5.33%) of the ostensible invitations A is vague about the arrangements. However, in 8 (1.18%) of genuine invitations A is vague about the arrangements.

H_5 (P_1>P_2): *There is a meaningful difference between the way inviters make arrangements in ostensible as opposed to genuine invitations.*



The comparison of ratios supports the hypothesis.

$Z_{0.05}$=1.645
$Z_{observed}$=42.85 42.85>>1.645 therefore $P_1>P_2$

(6) *A hedges the invitation to B.* A can show that his/her heart is not really in it by hedging the invitation with such expressions as "?agar saretaan migirad," "?agar maayel hastid," etc. In the sample, in 61.03% (412) of ostensible invitations A hedges the invitation to B. However, in only 5.77% (39) of the genuine invitations does A hedge the invitation to B. Again, the result of the comparison of ratios supported the hypothesis that:

H_6 ($P_1>P_2$): *There is a meaningful difference in the amount of hedging between ostensible and genuine invitations.*

$Z_{0.05}$=1.645
$Z_{observed}$=27.81 27.81>>1.645 therefore $P_1>P_2$

Figure 4.1. represents the frequencies and the percentages of hedging formulas for the ostensible exchanges in the corpus.



figure 4.1. Frequencies and percentages of hedging formulas

Formula	frequency	Percentage
?agar saretaan migirad. (If you like to drop in)	350	84.95%.
?agar maayel hastid. (If you desire to.)	29	07.03%
?agar maa raa laayeq/qaabel bedaanid. (If you think we deserve it.)	64	15.53%
?agar baraay-e shomaa zahmati nist. (If it does not bother you.)	19	04.61%

(7) *A delivers the invitation with inappropriate cues.* Usually genuine invitations are very vivid and crystal clear. Ostensible invitations, however, are fraught with inappropriate cues such as hesitations, pauses, down-casting of the eyes, rapid speech, and other non-verbal signs that manifest the pretense of the invitation. In my corpus, 4.74% (32) of the ostensible exchanges were delivered with inappropriate cues. However, 0% (0) of the genuine invitations were delivered inappropriately. The result of the comparison of ratios supported the following hypothesis:

H_7 (P_1>P_2): *There is a meaningful difference between the inviters' use of inappropriate cues in ostensible and genuine invitations.*

$Z_{0.05}$=1.645
$Z_{observed}$=6.103 6.103>1.645 therefore P_1>P_2

These seven features, of course, are not independent of each other. Making an event implausible and leaving the arrangements vague both work because the preparatory conditions for the invitation do not hold. Failing to motivate beyond social courtesy, failing to persist, and hedging all show A's lack of commitment to the invitation. And so does an inappropriate delivery. Once any of these features is defective, B has reason to suspect the invitation is insincere. If the defective feature seems obvious enough that A would have to expect that they mutually recognize it, B has reason to believe the invitation is ostensible.



4.3. Non-Linguistic Variables

As it was pointed out in chapter one, a large variety of social parameters and linguistic variables have been investigated by sociolinguists. It was also mentioned that the present study has limited its scope to such parameters as sex, age, and social class. In order to determine the probable effect(s) of these variables on the type of invitation, the

chi-square test was carried out on the observed data.



4.3.1. Sex

$H_0(\chi^2\alpha = \chi^2_{observed})$: *The type of invitation (ostensible/genuine) is not dependent on the sex of the inviter.*

$H_1(\chi^2\alpha < \chi^2_{observed})$: *The type of invitation is dependent on the sex of the inviter.*

In order to determine whether the type of invitation depends on the sex of the inviter or not, the chi-square test was carried out. The result of this test supported the research hypothesis $H_1(\chi^2\alpha < \chi^2_{observed})$ but rejected the null hypothesis $H_0(\chi^2\alpha = \chi^2_{observed})$.

$\chi^2\alpha$=3.841	df=1	α=0.05	
$\chi^2_{observed}$=94.507	94.507>>3.841	therefore	$\chi^2_{observed} > \chi^2\alpha$

In the corpus, male subjects extended 56.44% (381) of the ostensible and 30.22% (204) of the genuine invitations. Female subjects, on the other hand, extended 43.55% (294) of the ostensible invitations and 69.77% (471) of the genuine ones. (See Appendix B for the analysis of data by variables.)

4.3.2. Age

$H_0(\chi^2\alpha = \chi^2_{observed})$: *The type of invitation is not dependent on the age of the inviter.*

$H_1(\chi^2\alpha < \chi^2_{observed})$: *The type of invitation is dependent on the age of the inviter.*

The result of the chi-square test rejects the null hypothesis but supports the research hypothesis.

$\chi^2\alpha$=5.991	df=2	α=0.05	
$\chi^2_{observed}$=13.308	13.308>>5.991	therefore	$\chi^2_{observed} > \chi^2\alpha$

In the sample, 41.03% (277), 30.96% (209), and 28% (189) of the ostensible invitations were issued by young, adult, and old subjects respectively. On the other hand, 48.14% (325), 32% (216), and 19.85% (134) of the genuine invitations were extended by young, adult, and old subjects respectively.

4.3.3. Social Class

$H_0(\chi^2\alpha = \chi^2_{observed})$: *The type of invitation is not dependent on the social class of the inviter.*

$H_1(\chi^2\alpha < \chi^2_{observed})$: *The type of invitation is dependent on the social class of the inviter.*

The result of the chi-square test rejected the former hypothesis. It, however, supported the latter hypothesis.

$\chi^2\alpha$=5.991	df=2	α=0.05	
$\chi^2_{observed}$=124.143	124.143>>5.991	therefore	$\chi^2_{observed} > \chi^2\alpha$

In the corpus, 12% (81), 28.29% (191), and 59.70% (403) of ostensible invitations were issued by the low-class, mid-class, and high-class subjects respectively. On the other hand, 32.29% (218), 35.55% (240), and 32.14% (217) of genuine invitations were extended by the low-class, mid-class, and high-class subjects respectively.

4.4. Comparison with English

The comparison of Farsi and English ostensible invitations reveals that the apparent difference between the two languages is a matter of degree rather than nature. In other words, the nature of the strategies employed by the inviters in the process of extending

ostensible invitations in Farsi does not differ from that of English. However, the extent to which one feature is present in Farsi ostensible invitations slightly differs from that of the English language. This, no doubt, is in consonance with the universals of pragmatics. The similarity between English and Farsi ostensible invitations is greater in terms of such features as *solicitation, motivating,* and *hesitating.* The following figure (figure 4.2.) compares English and Farsi invitations in terms of the seven features that control them.

figure 4.2. Comparison of English and Farsi invitations by feature

	English		Farsi	
Feature	Ostensible	Genuine	Ostensible	Genuine
A makes B's presence at event E implausible.	44%	7%	85.18%	28%
A invites B only after B has solicited the invitation.	69%	19%	60.59%	2.37%
A does not motivate the invitation beyond social courtesy.	82%	47%	73.62%	2.96%
A does not persist or insist on the invitation.	82%	26%	91.55%	0.44%
A is vague about the arrangement.	69%	8%	5.33%	1.18%
A hedges the invitation to B.	42%	19%	61.03%	5.77%
A delivers the invitation with inappropriate cues.	61%	1%	4.74%	0%




Graph D.: % of genuine invitations: English versus Farsi
Percentage
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
7
28
19
2.37
47
2.96
26
0.44
8
1.18
19
5.77
1
0
Implausibility
Solicitation
Motivation
Hesitation
Arrangements
Hedging
Inappropriate cues
English
Farsi
Strategy

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSIONS AND PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS

5.0. Introduction

This chapter aims at: (1) providing a summary of the other chapters; (2) discussing the conclusions of the study; (3) discussing the pedagogical implications of the study; (4) discussing the limitations of the study; and (5) providing some suggestions for further research.

5.1. Summary of the Chapters

Chapter one of the study, *Introduction*, was meant as a point of departure. It was primarily designed to provide a full-fledged and well-fangled introduction to the chapters which would come later. As such, it concerned itself with discussing the preliminaries, the purpose of the study, the scope of the study, the statement of the problems, and the outline of the study.

Chapter two, *Review of the Related Literature*, was designed as a means of reviewing the background history of the field of sociolinguistics and pragmatics. It is useful in the sense that it will provide some kind of justification, or, say, answer, to any question (about the design of the present study as it is) that may pop up in the mind of the meticulous reader. In brief, this chapter: 1) elaborated on the significance of context and tried to illustrate the relationship between form, meaning, and function of an utterance; (2) provided a definition of pragmatics, traced the historical origin(s) of the different usages the term pragmatics has been put to, and outlined the scope of pragmatics; (3) reviewed the notion of the speech act theory, and enumerated the flaws and shortcomings involved with this theory; (4) delineated the different approaches to the study of conversation; (5) provided a periphery of such conversational principles as cooperative and politeness principles; (6) reviewed, in a detailed manner, the studies that had been carried out on invitations in general and ostensible invitations in particular; and (7) explained ostensible invitations in English.

Chapter three, *Methodology*: (1) defined the key terms and concepts used through out the study for purposes of clarifying the study; (2) introduced the subjects of the study; (3) described the materials used in the study and justified the selection of the corpus for the study; (4) outlined the characteristics of the data and explained the framework for the study; and (5) elaborated on the procedures used to the analysis of the data.

Chapter four, *Data Analysis*: (1) used necessary tables and graphs to present the results and findings of the data analysis; and (2) interpreted the tables statistically for purposes of making the study understandable.

5.2. Conclusions of the Study

In chapter one of the study, a number of questions were raised as the focus of the study (cf. chapter one.). The results of the data analysis and interpretation reveals that the answer to all the questions is positive. In other words, the defining properties of Farsi ostensible invitations are similar to those of the English language. It was also revealed that Iranian inviters take advantage of the same strategies in making the pretense of their invitations vivid as their English counterparts do. The difference is only a matter of degree.

Most illocutionary acts lead to certain reactions in addressees. A warning may frighten B, a question may get B to do what was ordered. These reactions are called *perlocutions* (See Austin, 1962; and Davis, 1979). Invitations have two expectable perlocutions.

P_1: *B comes to believe that A wants B to attend E.*
P_2: *B comes to feel that A likes or approves of B to an extent consistent with*

My corpus reveals that with genuine invitations, the situation makes both P_1 and P_2 possible. With ostensible invitations, however, the situation generally makes P_1 impossible. It gives B reason to believe that A does not really want B to attend event E. The situation, however, does not preclude P_2.

As such, ostensible invitations seem patently designed as face-saving devices. In chapter one, it was argued that politeness should be studied in the context of face-threatening acts (FTAs). It can, through analogy, be concluded that the purpose of

ostensible invitations, for the most part, is politeness. Indeed, many of the invitations in the corpus were extended when they were socially expected, when their absence would have offended B.

For most of the invitations in the sample B felt pleased at the gesture. It is, however, possible to feel hurt or insulted.

> Dr. Tavakoli is teaching Farsi literature at Meybod Azad University. Shahla (I am not allowed to quote the last name of the student) starts asking a series of questions. After answering some of the questions, Dr. Tavakoli comes to feel that Shahla is making fun of him. Holding a piece of chalk out towards her, he says:
>
> Dr. Tavakoli: *shomaa befarmaa.*
> (Here you are.)
> Shahla: *sharmande-?am.*
> (I am sorry.)

In this case, P_1 and P_2 are quite different:

> **P_1':** *B comes to believe that A does not want B to attend E.*
> **P_2':** *B comes to feel that A dislikes or disapproves of B to an extent consistent with P_1'.*

In brief, ostensible invitations, my data suggest, could be used for a good number of purposes and in a variety of situations. They can be used as a means of teasing other people, joking, etc. Their most important function, however, is expressing politeness.

5.3. Implications of the Study

The implications of this study can be discussed from two major perspectives: (1) on the one hand, the results of the study contribute to further explication of the linguistic theory in general and the pragmatic theory in particular; (2) on the other hand, the study serves a good number of applied purposes.

Modern linguistics has always been trying to establish a general, exhaustive, comprehensive, and unified theory of (the nature of) language. In this respect, a great deal of research projects have been carried out to evaluate the nature of this phenomenon. Some of these studies have scanned the linguistic aspects of language. Yet, others have fathomed the depth of the relationship between language and society. The problem with all these studies, according to Bernard Spolsky (cf. 3.5.), is that they are eclectic amalgams of old habits in new garnishes. Linguists, sociolinguists, and

psychologists will, therefore, fail to come up with a general linguistic theory unless they move towards the formation of a genuine interdisciplinary team. As such, the present study has tried to move in such a way as to be additive to the field of pragmatic universals.

This study also contribute to different domains of applied linguistics. Aspects of language use in general, and sociopragmatic aspects of language in specific, could be and should be employed in language teaching programs. Widdowson (1979:90) argues that language teaching should "effect the transfer from grammatical competence, a knowledge of sentences, to what has been called communicative competence, a knowledge of how sentences are used in the performance of communicative acts of different kinds." He also believes that grammatical competence will remain in a perpetual state of potentiality unless it is realized in communication. In other words, there are rules of use without which the rules of grammar would be useless. Widdowson also believes that theoretical studies of discourse might indicate the nature of the rules of use and provide some clues as to "how we might approach teaching them" (1979: 90). It is, therefore, the responsibility of ESL and EFL teachers to endeavor to make their students aware of and sensitive to the sociolinguistic variables that play an important role in different kinds of situational frames. These will serve as useful strategies for communication which will enable the learner to communicate his thoughts in actual contexts long after he has left the language classroom. These will, no doubt, help the second language learners in communication, translation, literary criticism, and a good number of other ways. The least they do is to ensure that the so-called pragmatic failures will not occur.

Having mastered the specific function of a given utterance, a translator will find it exceptionally easy to find the most appropriate equivalents in the target language. A knowledge of invitation formulas will help translators, especially those involved in the translation of texts with heavy cultural and social orientations. Film dubbers will also benefit from studies of this kind.

Furthermore, because many research projects have focused on the written aspects of

language, it is vital to carry out research with the aim of explicating the nature of spoken language. Studies of this kind will undoubtedly enable us to find out the different forms and functions of spoken language.

The results are also useful in teaching foreign languages. They will enable the foreign language teacher to decide on the language forms his students are supposed to learn. In the past, many teachers clang to Chomsky's ideal speaker-hearer hypothesis which, in turn, led to the choosing of sentence as the basic unit of language teaching. Later on, it was found that students entering higher education with the experience of six or more years of instruction in English at the secondary school, had considerable difficulty coping with language in its normal communicative use. This led many teachers to feel that it is only when language teaching has to be geared to specific communicative purposes that doubts as to the validity of this belief begin to arise. To them, a knowledge of how language functions in communication would no longer follow from a knowledge of sentence. Now, it was plain that studies concerning the communicative aspects of language, one of which is the investigation of *ostensible invitations*, had to be carried out to provide the theoretical bases upon which language teaching could be safely founded.

The results of the study are also applicable to materials development. According to Widdowson (1979, P.90):

Language teaching materials have in the past been largely derived from the products of theoretical sentence grammars. We now need materials which derive from a description of discourse; materials which will effect the transfer from grammatical competence, a knowledge of sentences, to what has been called communicative competence (Hymes 1971, Campbell and Wales, 1970), a knowledge of how sentences are used in the performance of communicative acts of different kinds. Grammatical competence remains in a perpetual state of potentiality unless it is realized in communication. As Hymes puts it 'There are rules of use without which the rules of grammar would be useless'. We might hope, as applied linguists, that theoretical studies of discourse might indicate the nature of such rules, and give us some clues as to how we might approach teaching them.

Interpreters will also find the results of this study of great interest. The results pave the way for successful choice of equivalent structures. They will also provide these people with insights as to the cultural aspects of language they must be able to take care of in their career.

Playwrights would also benefit from studies of this kind. Most of them start writing a drama without the vital knowledge of the communicative aspects of language. The end result will then be failure for the writer and disgust for the audience. Needless to say, the only way to stand aloof from such tragic situations can be found in studies of communicative competence.

5.4. Limitations of the Study

A good number of social factors such as culture, ethnicity, and generation are not easy to process. Researchers, therefore, usually keep aloof from them. In other words, sociolinguists indulge in the study of manageable factors and variables. For the same reason, the present study has limited its scope to such parameters as sex, age, and social class.

A second limitation of this study is related to the methods of data collection. The abstract nature of pragmatics is such that makes the utilization of a good number of methods of data collection impossible. The painful fact is that the remaining methods are not without restrictions. Observation, for instance, is influenced by the so-called observer paradox. Interview, on the other hand, is subject to inaccuracies of many types.

The data of this study include instances of ostensible invitations from a variety of speech communities (i.e. Yazdi, Shirazi, Tehrani, etc.). Therefore, the study is not limited in terms of the speech community to which it applies. However, making any generalization on the basis of the results of the study calls for a bigger repertoire of samples and instances.

5.5. Suggestions for Further Research

This study was primarily designed to find out whether Farsi ostensible invitations would function in consonance with the universals of pragmatics. Other similar studies, however, could be carried out with a set of different focuses. The following list outlines

some of the domains that call for research.

1) Evaluation of ostensible invitations in the regional dialects of Farsi such as Kurdish, Turkish, etc;
2) Evaluation of ostensible invitations in terms of the implications they endeavor to effect;
3) Evaluation of ostensible invitations with the aim of outlining their semantic and syntactic patterns;
4) etc.

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APPENDICIES

Appendix A: Analysis of invitations by feature

A invites B to E	**Observation**		**Interview**		**Totals**	
Strategies for making E Ostensible	**Ost.**	**Gen.**	**Ost.**	**Gen.**	**Ost.**	**Gen.**
A makes E implausible.	502	188	73	1	575	189
B can't come	394	34	51	1	445	35
B isn't interested	11	103	4	0	15	103
A can't provide	97	51	18	0	115	51
A makes E plausible.	64	419	36	67	100	486
B solicits invitation	342	13	67	3	409	16
By context	98	4	22	0	120	4
Indirectly	213	9	37	3	250	12
Directly	31	0	8	0	39	0
B doesn't solicit invitation	224	594	42	65	266	659
A doesn't motivate invitation	407	6	90	14	497	20
A motivates invitation	159	601	19	54	178	655
B hesitates or refuses	533	371	109	17	642	388
A doesn't persist	509	0	109	3	618	3
A does persist	24	371	0	14	24	385
A makes arrangements	34	593	8	28	42	621
A leaves arrangements vague	31	6	5	2	36	8
A makes arrangements specific	3	587	3	26	6	613
A hedges invitation	376	30	86	9	412	39
?agar saretaan migirad	303	7	47	2	350	9
?agar maayel hastid	3	0	26	1	29	1
?agar qaabel midunid	54	9	10	0	64	9
?agar zahmati nist	16	14	3	6	19	20
A uses inappropriate cues	31	0	1	0	32	0
gaze avoidance	18	0	0	0	18	0
pausing	0	0	0	0	0	0
mumbling	0	0	0	0	0	0
posture	6	0	1	0	7	0
intonation	7	0	0	0	7	0

Appendix B: *Analysis of invitations by variables.*

	Sex		Age			Economical Status		
	Male	Female	Young	Adult	Old	Low	Mid	High
Ostensible	381	294	277	209	189	81	191	403
Genuine	204	471	325	216	134	218	240	217

Notes:

Young: Aged between 15 to 30 years.
Adult: Aged between 30 to 45 years.
Old: Aged over 45 years.
Low-Class: Having an income below 1,000,000 Rials monthly.
Mid-Class: Having an income between 1,000,000 to 3,500,000 Rials monthly.
High-Class: Having an income over 3,500,000 Rials monthly.

A NOTE ON SYMBOLS

In order to be able to transcribe Farsi invitations a special kind of phonetic alphabet has been devised and employed in this study. The following table describes the symbols and provides sample words in which the sounds represented by the symbols have been used. Where the sound does not exist in English, the sample words have been provided in Farsi.

Symbol	Sample Word	Symbol	Sample Word
aa	arm	a	hat
o	saw	e	ten
u	too	b	bad
p	pen	t	tea
s	so	j	joke
ch	change	h	house
x	xashm	d	door
z	zoo	r	red
zh	vision	sh	shoe
q	qand, qam	f	foot
k	kill	g	gang
l	land	m	moon
n	noon	v	voice
y	yard	i	sheep
?	?l?aan		

NOTES:

1) The /?/ symbol represents glottal stop, and is used at the beginning of any syllable which begins with a vowel in Farsi:

e.g., ?al?aan ?emruz

2) The /q/ symbol represents the Farsi-specific consonants that appear at the beginning of the following proper nouns in Farsi.

e.g., Qom (A city near Tehran) Qolaam (Name of a male person)

3) The Farsi feature *tashdid* is represented in this study by the repetition of the sound that receives the feature.

e. g., mojaddad fotovvat

4) The /x/ symbol represents the Farsi-specific consonant that appears at the beginning of the following Farsi words.

e. g., xub (good) xaste (tired)