Language and Ideology: Linguistic and Philosophical Perspectives

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Abstract

This paper aims at tracing the interface of language and ideology mainly from two angles: philosophy and linguistics covering the period between 1846 and 1989. It deals with reviewing how the term 'ideology' has been dealt with as a concept, negative or positive, in philosophy from a Marxist and post-marxist points of view. It also reviews how the term has been linked to language in philosophical discussions, and how linguists have analysed the (re)construction and transmission of ideas, via language, in relation to the formulation of power relations. The basic arguments that lay behind this paper are that language and ideology are inseparable (Fowler & Kress, 1979) and that any discussion of ideology inevitably invites the discussion of language and its manifestations.

Keywords: critical linguistics, ideology, philosophy, linguistics

Ideology

Ideology: Philosophical Roots Linked to Language

An etymological trace of the word 'ideology' has demonstrated that it is derived from the French word idéologie, a combination of idéo- (Greek, idea), and -logie (Greek, logia). It was firstly coined by Destutt de Tracy in 1801 in his Traité de l'idéologie, to refer to what he calls a 'science of ideas' (Seliger, 1977; Hawkes, 2003). It is also argued that it originated as a "meta-science', a science of science' in the sense that it has the ability to give information about the origins of other sciences and "to give a scientific genealogy of thought" (Hawkes, 2003, p. 60). Tracy proposes that "nothing exists for us except by the ideas we have of it, because our ideas are our whole being, our existence itself" (cited in Hawkes, 2003, p. 60).

At almost the same time when Tracy introduced the notion, de Bonald used the term, though not as positive as Tracy's, to refer to "a sterile study, the working of thought upon itself, incapable of being creative" (cited in Seliger, 1977, p. 14). Such a reference gives a negative feel to the term and this negativity continues hereafter. Indeed, since its flourishing days in the eighteenth century, ideology has also been associated with Napoleon and his lead to the misfortunes of France which emphasizes its negativity (Thompson, 1984). Napoleon deprecated ideologues of their right; of not to adhere to his policies (Seliger, 1977) and criticized them for divorcing themselves of the practical reality and becoming psychotic, which eventually and gradually led to shifting the meaning of ideology from “denoting a sceptical [sic] scientific materialism to signifying a sphere of abstract, disconnected ideas” – an argument later embraced by Marx and Engels (Eagleton, 1991, p. 70).

Marx & Engels’ False Consciousness

The negativity overwhelming the term earlier during the times of the French Revolution continued until Marx and Engels presented the basic tenets of Marxism in Die deutsche Ideologie (The
German Ideology, written around 1846. Marx & Engels (1846) treat ideology as false consciousness. What they mean by consciousness is men's "conscious existence" that is "their actual life-process" (cited in Eagleton, 1991, p. 71). They clearly state their argument in the first statement in their preface; "hitherto men have constantly made up for themselves false conceptions about themselves, about what they are and what they ought to be" (p. 2). Hence, men, they argue, must have a "critical attitude" towards this "existing reality" (p. 2). This is a direct criticism on the German cultural and philosophical traditions that emerged in their time (Freeden, 2003). Marx and Engels argue that the German people, more specifically the working class, are made to have certain beliefs which are wrong, false, distorted and misguided. These are imposed on them by the political and social system of the time (Van Dijk, 1998). Such false beliefs are dominant and they are materialized by the ruling class, who are also the dominant class, (named bourgeois by Marx and Engels), on the subordinate working class, (named the proletariat). The former naturalizes beliefs for the latter to absorb. Thus, Marx and Engels consider ideology as "pure illusion, an inverted or distorted image of what is 'real'", and compare it to "a camera obscura, which represents the world by means of an image turned upside-down" ([original emphasis], Thompson, 1984, p. 5).

Beside defining ideology abstractedly, Marx and Engels (1846) make a slight distinction between consciousness and language. Although they do not directly state that language produces ideology, they imply that there is an interrelationship between the production of ideas and individuals’ use of language in real life. To quote them, “the production of ideas, of concepts, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men (…) language, like consciousness, only arises from the need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men” (p. 8).

Lenin’s ‘total belief’ and Language

The Russian Marxist Lenin in his pamphlet What is to be Done?, written between 1901 and 1902 (Seliger, 1977 ; Eagleton, 1991), uses the term ideology positively as 'total belief' to represent beliefs of both the bourgeois and the proletarian (Carr in Seliger, 1977). Like Marx and Engels, Lenin considers ideology as the beliefs that inspire specific groups or class to achieve political interests, however, such interests are not detestable, rather, they are approved. Lenin speaks of 'socialist ideology' which is defined as "a set of beliefs which coheres and inspires a specific group or class in the pursuit of political interests judged to be desirable" (Eagleton, 1991, p. 44). That is, as Eagleton describes, "often in effect synonymous with the positive sense of 'class consciousness'" (p. 44).

In his book Right of nations to self-determination, published in 1914, Lenin calls for an end to class distinction and for a single language to be spoken by all nations of Russia. He emphasizes the importance of language as a means of interaction indicating its effectiveness in the formulation of a nation’s economic future. Such an argument demonstrates that any discussion of the theory of ideology is not separable of language nor of society. To quote Lenin (1914),

Language is the most important means of human intercourse. Unity of language and its unimpeded development form one of the most important conditions for genuinely free and extensive commercial intercourse appropriate to modern capitalism, for a free and broad grouping of the population in all its separate classes, and, lastly, for the establishment of a close connection between the market and each and every proprietor, big or little, and between seller and buyer (pp. 2-3).
Lukács’s Class Consciousness and Language

Georg Lukács is another Marxist whose contributions to the theory of ideology are noteworthy. While Marx and Engels ignore the social conditions of ideology, in his book *History and class consciousness* (1922), Lukács focuses on the social aspects related to ideology and continues the discussion that originally initiated by Lenin on class consciousness. He emphasizes the universality of class consciousness, thus presenting the so-called the proletarian ideology. He argues that Marxism as a science is the ideological expression of the proletariat” (cited in Eagleton, 1991, p. 104). Another significant feature of Lukács’ approach is that "whereas for the early Marx and Engels, ideology is thought false to the true situation, for Lukács it is thought true to a false situation" (p. 104). Therefore, it can be said that Lukács considers ideology positively but attributes falsity to the social situation, that is to reality. This leads to his argument of the necessity of the participation of the thought in society. To quote Lukács (1922), "it is true that reality is the criterion for the correctness of thought. But reality is not, it becomes-and to become the participation of thought is needed" (p. 204). He, thus, emphasizes the functional rather than the earlier vulgar Marxist epistemological sense of ideology, which is so much an interest to linguists.

Another important facet in Lukács’ approach for linguists is the term commodity fetishism which was already used by Marx in *Capital* to account for the process of transformation of economic values from subjects to objects so that people consider them real. Lukács (1922) considers commodity fetishism’s influence [on] the total outer and inner life of society” ([original emphasis], p. 85), thus, laying forward the term ‘reification’ and emphasizing the objectification of social relations. His main focus is social and so he does ignore the role language plays in the process of reification.

However, Lecercle in his book *Marxist philosophy of language*, published in 2006, draws attention to a possible link between language and Lukács’ fetishism claiming that such a distinction helps us understand how language functions. Lecercle (2006) claims that this concept is closely related to language in the sense that "language is the source of fetishism: words have a natural tendency to freeze processes into objects (this is the function of ‘ontological metaphors’ which are all words of abstraction)” (p. 205). That is, in linguistic fetishism language processes and human relations are treated like things, they can be easily manipulated, exploited to construct theories, fought or even eliminated.

Gramsci’s Hegemony and Language

Another Marxist theorist that refers to the functional aspect of ideology is Antonio Gramsci, one of the neo-Marxists who has refocused the attention of theorists from the discussion of ideology from a theoretical angle to a practical one and from the abstract concept to the concrete term (Freeden, 2003). This is evident in his writings, known as *Prison Notebooks*, which clearly integrate the Marxist view of ideology with language, philosophy and politics, thus presenting a new perspective. Gramsci’s most widely-known concept is ‘hegemony’: “the ways in which a governing power wins consent to its rule from those it subjugates” (Eagleton, 1991, p. 112).

Gramsci discusses this concept in different manners, as related to different fields but the most relevant is the linguistic manner in which two major themes of hegemony can be mentioned here (Ives, 2004). The first is the interrelationships between individuals’ epistemological and philosophical issues and the daily operations of power, and the second is hegemony and language in the institutional structures of societies. In the first theme, Gramsci emphasizes that laypeople are spontaneous philosophers and their philosophy is constructed in language, common sense and popular religion which includes certain beliefs of conceptualizing the
world. The language referred to here is defined by Gramsci as "a totality of determined notions and concepts and not just of words grammatically devoid of content" (cited in Lecercle, 2006, p. 193). He, like Saussure, sees language as "a system or process of meaning production" and suggests that "structures of language, especially different types of grammar, are metaphors of hegemony" (Ives, 2004, p. 85).

Gramsci uses language as an 'analytical tool' to investigate hegemony and conceptions. The main basis for Gramsci's work is the argument that ideology is acquired via the language use in different institutions, organizations, classes, life activities as well as groups to which individuals belong, thus, emphasizing the centrality of language to politics and hegemony. In fact, Gramsci views language as essential for the constitution of hegemony, the establishment and expansion of the governing class, and the formulation of relationships between the government and the public mass (Ives, 2004). Indeed, hegemonic apparatuses such as family, school, media, sacred institutions, constituents of a civil society, make use of different forms of hegemony such as non-discursive practices and rhetorical utterances in order to bring individuals by consent, rather than coercively, to the ruling power. In this sense, the ruling power is interwoven so that it becomes the common sense (Eagleton, 1991).

Eagleton (1991) counterposes hegemony with ideology stating that the former is broader than the later “it *includes* ideology but is not reducible to it” ([original emphasis], p. 112). Hegemony enriches and expands the abstract ideology lending it “a material body and political cutting edge” (p. 115), therefore, ideology transits from being a system of ideas to a “lived, habitual social practice” (p. 115). Raymond Williams argues that while ideology is static, hegemony is dynamic (Eagleton, 1991).

**Althusser’s Ideological State Apparatus**

Another theorist whose work is noteworthy here is the post-Marxist Louis Althusser who lays forward a Marxist argument that directly relates ideology to discourse. Althusser is best known for his essay *Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses*, published in English in 1971. Althusser’s notion is considered an evolvement of Gramsci’s account of hegemony, ideology and state power (Ramos, 1982). He criticizes the classical Marxist theory of the state distinguishing between the state apparatus (henceforth SA) and his ideological state apparatus (henceforth ISA). They both function in a social formation, however, SA functions by repression while ISA mainly by ideology. The first is entirely public constituting institutions such as the government, army, prison, etc. while the second mainly belongs to the private domain; religious (e.g. church), educational (e.g. school), communicational (e.g. press), etc. Schools, for example, Lecercle (1999) argues, are dominant ISAs where children are taught speech manners, that is, they are taught “to conform to the established order of class domination” (p. 155).

Althusser’s (1971) second advancement of the vulgar Marxist theory depends on the following two arguments: first, questioning ideology should start from class struggle constituted in ISA. The second argument emphasizes the social aspect of the term drawing attention to how ideology functions ‘‘to ‘cement’ together the social formation and adapt individuals to its requirements’’ (p. 147). This is closely related to the functional aspect of ideology which was previously discussed by Gramsci.

Althusser’s (1971) third thesis is that ideology interpolates individuals as subjects. By interpellation (hailing), he means the process in which ideology recruits and transforms individuals in their day-to-day social interactions, as in “there is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects”
(p. 170), and that ideology and subjects are interrelated in the sense that subjects constitute all ideology only if ideology functions as constitutive of all subjects (concrete individuals). We are ideological subjects and we function as such even at an everyday basis when we practice daily-life rituals such as shaking hands. For Eagleton (1991), this thesis is one of the shortcomings of Althusser’s theory in the sense that it equates “all subjects with human ones for legally speaking companies and local authorities can be subjects too” (p. 148).

Although Althusser’s subjects’ interpellation is not explicitly linked to language, it is explained, from a linguistic point of view by Lecercle (1999) stating that the process of interpellation involves a linguistic interaction. Indeed, Althusser shifts from the theory of ideology as the theory of cognition (false consciousness) to the theory of affectiveness (representation of experience) (Eagleton, 1991). For Eagleton, this affective theory of ideology involves the discussion of discourse in the sense that the expression of ideology is done through discourse, through “performative utterances” or speech acts. Therefore, within such an ideological discourse “the affective typically outweighs the cognitive” (p. 21).

The fourth Althusserian argument is that ideology has a material existence; acquiring its materialistic nature from its existence in the practices of apparatuses. For example, when a subject (an individual) consciously chooses to believe in a conceptual belief such as justice, they naturally have a “(material) attitude”, that is they will behave in a certain way, and embrace a certain attitude; they “will submit unconditionally to the rules of the Law, and may even protest when they are violated, sign petitions, take part in a demonstration, etc.” (Althusser, 1971, p. 167). To quote Althusser, the ideas that subjects have are their “material actions inserted into material practices governed by material rituals which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which derive the ideas of that subject” ([original emphasis], p. 169). All of these materialities are influenced by different modalities such as gestures, body language, external verbal discourse or internal verbal discourse (consciousness), etc. Lecercle (2006) considers these materialities as a sequential, thus, presenting the term Althusserian chain of interpellation. This chain "runs from institutions to rituals, from rituals to practices, from practices to linguistic acts: each link has its own materiality and has something of the materiality of the whole chain" (p. 102), and "at the end of which [this chain] the individual is interpellated as a subject" (p. 165).

Eagleton (1991) criticizes the uses of the word material in association with ideology because if everything is ‘material’, even thought itself, then the word loses all discriminatory force”. Eagleton continues,

Althusser’s insistence on the materiality of ideology – the fact that it is always a matter of concrete practices and institutions – (…) stems from a structuralist hostility to consciousness as such. It forgets that ideology is a matter of meaning, and that meaning is not material in the sense that bleeding or bellowing are. It is true that ideology is less a question of ideas than of feelings, images, gut reactions; but ideas often figure importantly within it ([original emphasis], p. 149).

Althusser’s last argument is that “ideology is a ‘Representation’ of the Imaginary Relationship of Individuals to their Real Conditions of Existence” ([original emphasis] p. 162). This statement simply means that what people represent in ideology “is not their real conditions of existence, their real world”, rather, “it is their relation to those conditions of existence which is represented to them there” (p. 164). Thus, ideology is a representation of social experience. It is not a mere description of
For Althusser, ideology constitutes our identities on the one hand, and on the other it is an unknown universal truthfulness. Out lived experiences might constitute elements of falsehood, that is of inauthenticity, this is simply because, as Eagleton argues, relations involve a set of beliefs and assumptions which are “open to judgments of truth and falsehood” (p. 21).

Althusser’s previous propositions are well-received by critical linguists and critical discourse analysts who mainly base their approaches on his views. Simpson & Mayer (2010), for example, state that Althusser “was one of the first to describe power as a discursive phenomenon, arguing that ideas are inserted into the hierarchical arrangement of socially and politically determined practices and rituals” (p. 5).

**Foucault’s Power and Discourse**

Although Foucault is a philosopher and literary critic, his propositions with regard to ideology, language, discourse and linguistics, which are partially based on Marxism, are influential in the development of the interface of discourse and ideology. Foucault (1979) finds the notion ideology difficult to define because of this opposition to truth, its relation to subject and its relation to determinants of discourse. He differs from previous vulgar Marxists in the sense that he does not see economic relations as primary in determining power relations. He considers economics, social structures and discourses as interacting complicatedly to produce power without necessarily having equal dominance. Foucault relates the two notions ideology and discourse to a new notion, namely ‘power’.

Although both Althusser and Foucault insist "on the primacy of language and the mediation of discourse before an immediate understanding of bodily need" (Ryder, 2013, p. 153), Foucault (1979) criticizes Althusser’s state apparatus saying that power is not only in possession of the state, but it is also extended “beyond the limits of the State, to include “the ways in which people negotiate power relations”. That is, power cannot be possessed by one group because it is not “so easily contained”, it is “more a form of action or relation between people which is negotiated in each interaction and is never fixed and stable” (cited in Mills, 1997, pp. 38-40). Indeed, "not every body of belief which people commonly term ideological is associated with a dominant political power" (Eagleton, 1991, [original emphasis], p.6). Eagleton wonders that if this is the case then what do we call the beliefs of Levellers, Suffragettes, Feminists, etc.? And will these beliefs be ideological once they become on power?

On the relation between discourse and power Foucault (1978) states that “discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines it and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it” (cited in Mills, 1997, p. 45). According to Foucault (1972), discourse is not "a group of signs or a stretch of text" rather, it is "practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak" (cited in Mills, 1997, p. 17). "In this sense", explains Mills, "a discourse is something which produces something else (an utterance, a concept, an effect), rather than something which exists in and of itself and which can be analysed in isolation" (p. 17). Therefore, any discussion of discourse invites the discussion of power and "the ways in which people negotiate power relations" and claims that “resistance is already contained within the notion of power" (Mills, 1997, pp. 40-42). In his own words, Foucault's proclaims "where there is power there is resistance" (cited in Mills, 1997, p. 42). Although, for Eagleton (1991), acknowledging "both the wider and narrower senses of ideology" is important, broadening the term is problematic in the sense that the concept will become “politically toothless”, that is, it will vanish hence “any word which covers everything loses its cutting edge and dwindles to an empty sound” (p. 7).
Ideology: Linguistics Views

So far, the term ideology has been dealt with as a concept from different senses in philosophy. In a way or another, the Marxist philosophers Marx & Engels, Lenin, Lukács, Gramsci, Althusser “have offered theoretical accounts on the formation and operation of ideology in modern societies”. Their theories are cognitively, socially and politically interwoven, however, in fact, “are seldom linked” to a comprehensive enquiry of actual ideologies”, that is they never account for how ideology is actually manifested in the conceptions and expressions of everyday life (Thompson, 1984, p. 232), how it is constructed, demonstrated and represented by language (visual or verbal) and, consequently how it is tackled and analysed by linguists.

A chronological trace of the relationship between the scientific study of language and the study of ideology demonstrates that it descends back to the 1920s, to a period often referred to as Marrism; which is a term used to signify the theory of ideology presented by the Russian linguist Nikolaj Jakovlevic Marr, and which is a derived thought from Marxism. Recently, two books have been published on the interface between ideology and linguistics, namely Cerny’s Historia dela Linguistica in 1998 and Andreas Gardt’s Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft in Deutchland in 1999. In the first book, ideology is not defined but used as a common sense to mean 'political superstructure', and the meaning of ideology as explored in the linguistic research (Koerner, 2001). These books along with Koerner’s paper Ideology in the 19th and 20th century linguistics argue that traditional linguistic research focuses on many areas in which ideology has been significantly present, some of them are on mother tongue studies, linguistic typology and studies on the original Indo-European homeland. The first volume of Language and Ideology: Theoretical and Cognitive Approaches, in which Koerner’s paper is included, focuses on the ways cognitive linguistics contribute to the investigation of overt and covert ideologies and sheds light on the politics of linguistics during the Nazi period in Germany.

Voloshinov’s Marxism and the Philosophy of Language

Ferdinand de Saussure, the well-known linguist to establish the structural school of linguistics in the 1920s, states that "a language is a system of signs expressing ideas" (cited in Hawkes, 2003, p. 142) and that "all aspects of social life, to the degree that they are significant, are structured like a language” (Hawkes, 2003, p. 142).

Impressed and influenced by Saussure's Course in General Linguistics, Voloshinov (1973) integrates linguistics and the study of signs to ideology in his book Marxism and the Philosophy of Language – originally published as Marksizm i Filosofiya Yazyka in 1929. He, in fact, introduces the first semiotic theory of ideology and he is also considered the father of Discourse Analysis (Eagleton, 1991). Direct from the beginning, Voloshinov (1973) argues that all the bases of the Marxist theory of ideology including scientific knowledge, religion, ethics, and literature are related to the problems raised in the philosophy of language. He, therefore, proposes the following arguments.

First, ideology, and by virtue anything ideological, is transmitted by sign, and "without signs there is no ideology". A sign has meaning in the sense that "it represents, depicts, or stands for something lying outside of itself" ([original emphasis], Voloshinov, 1973, p. 9). Second, anything ideological exists “in the special, social material of signs created by man. Its specificity consists precisely in its being located between organised individuals, in its being the medium of their communication” (p. 12). Signs, or what has become now ideology, arise and take shape when two members are "organised socially", that is, when "they compose a group (a social unit)” ([original emphasis], p. 12). Consciousness of one member does not stand alone, it is "a social-
ideological fact" (p. 12), and it is "nurtured on signs" (p. 13). This view constructs an objective study of ideology

Third, because social communication, and by end, signs, can be completely expressed via language, Voloshinov (1973) brings about the inevitable discussion of words. Thus, "the word is the ideological phenomenon par excellence". It is characterised by, first, semiotic purity in the sense that it functions as a sign. Also, it is a neutral sign because it “can carry out ideological functions of any kind – scientific, aesthetic, ethical, religious”. Moreover, it is involved chiefly in behavioural communication. Another feature of a word is "its ability to become an inner word, and finally, its obligatory presence, as an accompanying phenomenon, in any conscious act". Such characteristics, according to Voloshinov, "make the word the fundamental object in the study of ideologies" and materialize it, and invite studying it using an approach that is based on a Marxist sociological method; the method itself is based on the philosophy of language ([original emphasis], pp. 13-15).

This focus on words, but not signs, as the basic units of discourse is advantageous, according to Lecercle (2006) who argues that this contribution to the theory of ideology emphasizes the importance of the study of meaning in analysing language. He also argues that Voloshinov’s focus on words as the basic units of linguistic analysis, but not sentences, is also a pro in the sense that it "underlines the fact that pragmatics cannot be excluded from the field of science" (p. 107).

Pêcheux’s Language, Semantics and Ideology

Voloshinov’s emphasis on the crucial role of semantics and meaning is successively embraced by the French Althusserian linguist Pêcheux in his book Les Vérités de la Palice (1975) – published in English in 1982 as Language, Semantics and Ideology. Pêcheux (1982) criticizes the mainstream philosophical trends of ideology by blaming philosophers for not reflecting on linguistics or language stating that they simply jumped "off-point for an 'intrinsically philosophical' result" which is a drawback resulting in "a misconception of the nature of philosophy" (p. 171). Like Voloshinov, Pêcheux claims that philosophy and linguistics are related in a way or another. For example, issues discussed by philosophers so far such as meaning, communication, speaking-subject, etc. are of an interest to linguists (Pêcheux, 1982). For example, the linguistic Saussurian distinction between langue and parole of the speaking-subject can be found in the earlier disparity between the study of logic and rhetoric and language existence and use. Pêcheux argues that semantics (in particular) and linguistics (in general) are concerned with philosophy.

Pêcheux (1982) criticizes Althusser for saying little about linguistics, and nothing (…) about ‘semantics’” (p. 16), however, implicitly concerns the interplay of philosophy and semantics, which necessitates, what Pêcheux calls, “a material theory of discourse” where attention is drawn to the manifestation of ideology in everyday life’s conceptions and expressions (p. 102). Thus, his proposed theory of discourse stems from his basic argument that "ideologies are not made up of 'ideas' but of practices" (p. 98). Pêcheux’s new account on ideology is, thus, an integration of the Althusserian Marxist thought with the analytical methods flourished by modern linguistics and other disciplines (Thompson, 1984). The importance of Pêcheux’s approach lies in the following theses.

First, "the meaning of a word, expression, proposition, etc., does not exist in 'itself' (…) but is determined by the ideological positions brought into play in the socio-historical process in which
words, expressions and propositions are produced (i.e. reproduced)”. The ‘ideological positions' referred to here are termed 'ideological formations', meaning the social and historical context in which the production and reproduction of words and propositions take place. Second, words, expressions, propositions, etc., change their meaning according to the positions held by those who use them, which signifies that they find their meaning by reference to those positions, i.e., by reference to the ideological formations (...) in which those positions are inscribed (original emphasis), Pêcheux, 1982, p. 111).

Third, the meaning of these words or propositions "is constituted (...) in the relationships into which one word, expression or proposition enters with other words, expressions or propositions of the same discursive formation" (p. 112). That is, a meaning of a specific word is formulated via its relation to other words, that is to its discursive formation. Pêcheux’s distinction between discursive process and discursive formation is an extension of Saussure’s distinction between langue (the abstract system of language) and parole (particular utterances) (Eagleton, 1991).

Sociolinguists’ Views on Power and Ideology

In sociolinguistics, the notion of ideology is not dealt with, but power is one of the core issues discussed in correlational sociolinguistics. Power, in sociolinguistics, is seen “important for the basic organisation of society in terms of social classes, with the rich and powerful at the top and the poor and powerless at the bottom” (Hudson, 1996, p. 240). Therefore, power is seen as a determinant of how society is divided in classes. It is linked to the so-called solidarity which “concerns the social distance between people- how much experience they have shared, how many social characteristics they share (religion, sex, age, region of origin, race, occupation, interests, etc.), how far they are prepared to share intimacies, and other factors” (p. 122). These are variables that determine the class to which individuals in a society belong, as well as the linguistic choices made to communicate.

The first to talk about power and solidarity in sociolinguistics is the social psychologist Roger Brown in 1960s (Hudson, 1996). Brown & Gilman’s (1960) study of the French pronouns ‘tu’ and ‘vous’ differs from the mainstream variationistic sociolinguistic studies in the sense that it considers “general and powerful sociological regularities underlying them”. It also situates “power and solidarity dimensions in the contexts of history and ideology” (Fowler & Kress, 1979, p. 191). Labov (1966) in his book The Social Stratification of English in New York City studies the phonological linguistic structure of /r/ and how it is used by higher and lower classes.

Variationist sociolinguists exclude the role that ideology plays in shaping power relations. Sociolinguistics does not criticize the social structure, rather it normalises linguistic practices by considering them as variables. If, for example, higher class speaks in a certain manner, the lower class will try to adapt to fit in the social norms. Ferguson claims that “an outsider who learns to speak fluent, accurate L and then uses it in a formal speech is an object of ridicule” ([emphasis added], cited in Fowler & Kress, 1979, p. 193). Fluency and accuracy, then, are seen as normal determinants of the native and ‘outsiders’, lower in status here, attempt to speak appropriately in order to fit in the established socioeconomic norm which, as a result, reinforces power differences and normalises them.

Critical Linguists: A Shift in Focus

Another approach which shares some linguistic values with sociolinguistics is critical linguistics, proposed by Fowler & Kress (1979) in their chapter Critical Linguistics in Language and...
Control (Fowler et al. 1979). It is also one of the developments of stylistics. Both sociolinguistics and critical linguistics emphasize the bound between linguistic structure and social structure. However, the former is more concerned with differences in power relations while the latter centralizes the two notions power and ideology. One more thing is that sociolinguists concern themselves with describing the effect of the arbitrary relationship between language and society and emphasize that social structure has an effect on language use. Critical linguists, on the other hand, do not reinforce or discover the links between language and society because for them “language is an integral part of social process” (Fowler & Kress, 1979, p. 189) and they claim that there is a “two-way relationship between language and society” (p. 190). That is, social structure has an effect on language use and vice versa.

Fowler & Kress (1979) propose that “linguistic meaning is inseparable from ideology, and both depend on social structure” and that linguistic structure carries specific meaning in a specific context which emphasizes the need for a linguistic analysis of power relations embedded in texts. Such an analysis must concern critically interpreting real texts presented in society (Fowler & Kress, 1979). Interpretation here is “the process of recovering the social meanings expressed in discourse by analysing the linguistic structures in the light of their interactional and wider social contexts” (p. 196). And ‘critically’ is “an activity of unveiling (…) an activity of demystification” that is unfolding any hidden or implicit meanings in texts (p. 196). ‘Critical’ also means that it “is aware of the assumptions on which it is based and prepared to reflect critically about the underlying causes of the phenomena it studies, and the nature of the society whose language it is” (p. 186). Thus, awareness means that the linguistic analysis aimed must be formulated on a set of ideologies to be tested (e.g. feminist ideologies), and preparation means that it is equipped by a practical linguistic toolkit that is used to unravel ideologies, power relations, or stances in the analysis of texts and discourse without the need of an advanced background in linguistic theory.

The toolkit they propose concerns five linguistic structures including the grammar of transitivity (events, states, processes), the grammar of modality (the interpersonal relations of the speaker and the hearer), transformations (the manipulation of linguistic material), the grammar of classification (linguistic ordering), and coherence (the unity and order of discourse). What is noteworthy here is that Fowler (1996) suggests a modification of the approach so that it also pays attention to the role the reader plays in the reading process. Such a model, argues Fowler, is able “to equip readers for demystificatory readings of ideology-laden texts” (p. 6).

Another relevant work to Fowler & Kress (1979) is Hodge & Kress’ (1979/ 1993) Language as Ideology. Wunderlich (1980) reviews the book and claims that it is a theory of language not a practical book like Language and Control. Hodge & Kress (1979) define ideology as “a systematic body of ideas” (cited in Wunderlich, 1980, p. 1059) and it “involves a systematically organized presentation of reality” (Hodge & Kress, 1979, p. 15). These arguments had already been claimed by Marxists but here they are merged with psychological and sociological views. Language for Hodge & Kress (1979) is the “medium of consciousness for a society, its forms of consciousness externalized”, and linguistics is “the instrument of analysis of consciousness and its ideological bases” (p. 1059). They propose a model of analysing underlying structures and ideology that is derived from the Chomskyan transformational theory of linguistics. They also make use of the theory of semantics and linguistic feature classification which in turn, as they argue, contains ideology. Linguistic structure, according to Hodge & Kress (1979), reflects social structure, manifests power, is manipulated to manipulate, or is employed to achieve or endure power.
Work in *Language as Ideology* is continued in Hodge & Kress’ (1988) *Social Semiotics*, however, with a deviation from linguistics and a much focus on meaning at large conveyed in different forms of social communication other than verbal language. Hodge & Kress (1988) criticise the critical linguistics presented in the closing year of 1970s for attributing primacy to language and for investigating verbal language, excluding any other language forms. Thus, they extend the critical linguistics scope to include the investigation of visual language, as well because for them, meaning is seen as residing ‘pervasively’ and ‘strongly’ in codes other than verbal language such as visual, aural, behavioural, that is to all sign systems. Another developments of critical linguistics is Sara Mills (1995) *Feminist Stylistics*. Both make use of analytical tools developed in Halliday’s systematic functional grammar such as transitivity, and both concern the analysis of ideology embedded in non-literary texts such as newspaper articles and advertisements as well as literary ones.

**Conclusion**

In this paper, different accounts, from the disciplines of philosophy and linguistics, related to the term ideology were critically revisited starting from its appearance in the 18th century when it was conceptualized as the system of ideas, later used by Marx and Engels as a distorted and false beliefs. Lenin viewed it positively from a socialist perspective as the beliefs that inspire specific groups or class to achieve political interests. The next generation of Marxists consider the functional aspects of ideology rather than the epistemological ones already referred to by vulgar Marxists. These include Lukács, Gramsci, Althusser and Foucault. The last three scholars, however, broaden the term by referring to hegemonic practices, power relations and discourse.

Ideology and its manifestations are also the subject of discussion in linguistics. Voloshinov, the father of discourse analysis, bases his arguments on the structural school in linguistics and argues that ideology is expressed by signs, realized linguistically in words. Pêcheux argues that the production and reproduction of the meanings of linguistic structures are determined by the ideological positions held by users of language. Work done in sociolinguistics does not, however, focus on ideology but rather on the linguistic referents of power and the role they play in the distribution of power between language users. The final approach considered in the discussion of ideology is critical linguistics. While sociolinguists concern themselves with describing the effect of the arbitrary relationship between language and society, the critical linguists Fowler et al. (1979) argue that “linguistic meaning is inseparable from ideology, and both depend on social structure” and that linguistic structure carries specific meaning in a specific context which emphasizes the need for a linguistic analysis of power relations embedded in texts.

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